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To understand the present and forecast for the future of federal tax
treatment of charitable organizations, it is not sufficient to study the changes
made by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. To place those changes in proper
perspective, it is helpful to trace the development of the prior tax treatment
of charities from the beginning of our federal income, gift and estate tax
laws. The following article attempts to meet this need by studying the prior
history of the charitable exemption, deduction and the unrelated business tax,
as a prelude to other articles in this symposium that cover changes made by
the 1969 Act.
I
HISTORY OF CHARITABLE EXEMPTION

A.

Early History

For as long as we have had federal income tax laws, our charitable institutions have been exempted from tax thereunder. The first federal income tax
exemption for charitable organizations appeared in the Act of 1894.1 A year
later, the Act of 1894 was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company.'
In 1903, Congress granted a federal charter of incorporation, including a
provision for a self-perpetuating board of trustees and exemption from federal taxation, to the Rockefeller-funded General Education Board, in accordance with an established congressional habit of granting charters to educational organizations. 3 Similarly, a federal charter was granted by Congress to
the Carnegie Institute of Washington in 1904 and to the Carnegie Foundation
* Partner, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D.C. and Atlanta, Ga.
t Law Clerk, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D.C.
1. Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 553.
2.
158 U.S. 601 (1895).
3. J. LANKFORD, CONGRESS AND THE FOUNDATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 9 (1964).
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for the Advancement of Teaching in 1906. 4 However, a growing congressional hostility to large private foundations was evidenced by the Rockefeller
Foundation's unsuccessful attempt between 1910 and 1913 to obtain a federal
charter including tax exemption (a state charter was acquired instead from
the State of New York in 1913). '
The Corporate Excise Act of 19096 imposed a "special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business" by "every corporation, joint stock
company, or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares," (amounting to one per cent of net income over $5,000);'
but the statute exempted from tax, among other organizations, 8
[A]ny corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of
which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual.
Already in the 1909 Act the present phrase, "organized and operated exclusively," appears, and it is here that the "private inurement" language
originated.' The Congressional Record, containing the debates concerning this
statute, shows that some senators believed that the nonprofit charities would
not have been subject to the corporate excise tax anyway; 10 but the view that a
specific exemption was necessary prevailed."
The Revenue Act of 1913, a2 enacted after the ratification of the sixteenth
amendment, contained an exemption provision for charitable organizations
which followed the language of the 1909 exemption, except that it added
"scientific" (after the word "charitable") as an exempt purpose.a The sponsor
14
of this addition felt that it required no elaborate justification.
B.

Walsh Commission Report

Hostility toward large private foundations was evidenced again in 1916
with the publication of the Walsh Commission Report. 15 This commission,

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11-19.
Ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
Id. § 38.
Id.
Id. In the present provision, there is a minor variation of "net income," instead of "net

earnings."
10. 44 CONG. REC. 4148-51 (1909); W. SMITH & C. CHIECHI, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS BEFORE
AND AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 11 (1974).
11. 44 CONG. REc. 4151 (1909); W. SMITH & C. CHIECHI, szipra note 10, at 11.
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Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.

13.
14.
15.

Ch. 16, § I IG(a), 38 Stat. 114.
50 CONG. REC. 1305-06 (1913).
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S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) [hereinafter cited as
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created by Congress in 1912,16 included in its mandated study of industrial
relations an inquiry into the role of private foundations in the "Concentration
of Wealth and Influence" felt by the Commission's majority to have reached
dangerous proportions. 7 According to the Commission's report:"8
The domination by the men in whose hatqds the final control of a large
part of American industry rests is not limited to their employees, but is being
rapidly extended to control the education and "social service" of the Nation.
This control is being extended largely through the creation of enormous
privately managed funds for indefinite purposes, hereinafter designated
"foundations," by the endowment of colleges and universities, by the creation
of funds for the pensioning of teachers, by contributions to private charities,
as well as through controlling or influencing the public press.
The Walsh Report begrudged the foundations their exemption, but believed its elimination to be impracticable: 19
The funds of these foundations are exempt from taxation, yet during the
lives of the founders are subject to their dictation for any purpose other than
commercial profit.
As regards the "foundations" created for unlimited general purposes and endowed with enormous resources, their ultimate possibilities are so grave a
menace, not only as regards their own activities and influence but also the
benumbing effect which they have on private citizens and public bodies, that
if they could be clearly differentiated from other forms of voluntary altruistic
effort it would be desirable to recommend their abolition. It is not possible,
however, at this time to devise any clear-cut definition upon which they can
be differentiated.
Instead, the report recommended that all incorporated nonprofit making organizations, chartered to be broad-functioned and having funds in excess of
one million dollars, be required to obtain a federal charter, which would provide: (1) a "definite limitation" on the amount of allowable funds, (2) "definite
and exact specifications" of the organization's "powers and functions," (3)
"specific provision against the accumulation of funds by the compounding of
unexpended income and against the expenditure in any one year of more
than 10 per cent of the principal," (4) "rigid inspection" as to "investment and
expenditure of funds," (5) "open reports" to government officials, and (6)
provision against performing work not specifically authorized in the charter,
without unanimous approval of its board and notification of Congress.2 " The
Walsh Report also recommended that Congress make a thorough study
of large foundations 2 I and recommended an increase in the federal gov-

16.
17.
19.
20.

Act of August 23, 1912, ch. 351, 37 Stat. 415.
WALSH REPORT 80-86.
WALSH REPORT 81.
WALSH REPORT 81, 85.
WALSH REPORT 85.

21.

Id.

18.
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ernment's expenditures for education and social service as a means of "counteracting the influence of the foundations. '22 However, these recommendations were not acted upon then. As described by Lankford, =3 hostility against
foundations waned, as the attention of Congress and the foundations turned
to the war; the Rockefeller Foundation dropped its controversial investigation
into labor conditions 24 and Belgian relief received a large portion of its 1915
25
expenditures.
The basic charitable exemption provision gradually advanced toward its
present state 26 with the passage of the Revenue Acts of 1918, 1921, and 1934.
The Revenue Act of 1918 added to the exempt purposes "the prevention of
crtIehty to children or animals."-2 7 The Revenue Act of 192 1 added "literarv"
to the exempt purposes and added categories of organizations eligible for the
exemption "corporations, companies, or associations" in the Act of 1894,28
"corporation or association" in the Corporate Excise Act of 190929 and in the
Revenue Act of 1913,0 and "corporations" only in the Revenue Act of
1918,1 so as to include, as in present section 501(c)(3), "[c]orporations, and
any community chest, fund, or foundation.

C.

3 2

Legislative Activities

The Revenue Act of 1934 added the requirement that "no substantial
part of the activities" of the organization "be carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation. '3 3 This new provision origi-

nated as an amendment, proposed in the Senate by Senator Harrison, which
read: "and no substantial part of the activities of which is participation in
partisan politics or is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. '3 4 The rationale of the amendment is not explained in the
36
35
Senate report, but its sponsor said to the Senate:

1 may say to the Senate the attention of the Senate committee was called to
the fact that there are certain organizations which are receiving contributions
in order to influence legislation and carry on propaganda. The committee

22.

WAi.SH REPORT

23.

J.

24.

Id. at 27.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 32.

35.
36.

86.

LANKFORD, supra note 3,

at 32.
3

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)( ).

Ch. 18, § 231(6), 40 Stat. 1057.
Ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509.
Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11.
Ch. 16, § llG(a), 38 Stat. 114.
Ch. 18, § 231(b), 40 Stat. 1057.
Ch. 136, § 231(6), 42 Stat. 227.
Ch. 277, §§ 101(6), 23(o)(2), 48 Stat. 680.
H.R. REP. No. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
21 THE TAX LAWYER 968 (1968).
78 CONG. REC. 5959 (1934).
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thought that there ought to be an amendment which would stop that, so that
is why we have put this amendment in the bill ....
The House accepted the amendment, after striking the phrase, "participating
in partisan politics. '3 7 This action was explained in the House, "[w]e were
afraid this prohibition was too broad, and we succeeded in getting the Senate
conferees to eliminate organizations, a substantial part of the activities of
which was participation in partisan politics. 38 It has been suggested that the
primary focus of the proponents of the 1934 legislation was aimed at a particular organization (the National Economy League), was not well conceived,
39
and showed no awareness of prior case law on the subject.
However, the concept of restricting legislative activities of charitable organizations had originated long before 1934; the Treasury had incorporated
the principle, with particular reference to "controversial" and "partisan" activities with respect to "educational organizations," into its Regulations in
1919.4 ' The Regulation stated: "But associations formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not educational within the meaning of
41
the statute.
The Board of Tax Appeals had applied a restriction on the carrying on of
controversial political activity by charitable organizations in cases during the
1920's.42 In Slee v. Commissioner,4 3 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
had affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals holding that gifts
made by a taxpayer to the American Birth Control League could not be deducted from income. On the one hand, Judge Learned Hand explained that
the League was "organized for charitable purposes," in that it operated a
non-profit clinic offering birth control advice to married women. However,
the League's purposes were not, he thought, "exclusively charitable, educational, or scientific" in that its charter declared the purpose of effecting the
44
repeal of anti-birth control statutes:
This raises the only question which seems to us important, which is,
whether the League is also agitating for the repeal of laws preventing birth
control .... Political agitation as such is outside the statute, however innocent
the aim, though it adds nothing to dub it "propaganda," a polemical word
used to decry the publicity of the other side. Controversies of that sort must
37.

H.R. REP. No. 1385 (Conferences Rep.), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934).

38. 78 CONG. REC. 7831 (1934).
39. Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity of the Restrictions on Influencing Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FED. TAXATION 1415, 1421 (1973).
40. Clark, The Limitation on PoliticalActivities: A DiscordantNote in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L.
REV. 439, 446 (1960).
41. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517, T.D. 2831, 21 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 285 (1920), quoted in
Clark, supra note 40, at 446.
42. Clark, supra note 40, at 446. Clark cites Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1927) and Sophie
G. Coxe, 5 B.T.A. 261 (1926), acquiescing VI-1 CuM. BULL. 2 (1927).
43. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
44. 42 F.2d at 185.
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be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from
them.
Nor, explained Hand, did the League's legislative activity fit within the protected category of work "to relieve itself of the restraints of law in order to
better conduct its charity."4 5
Nevertheless, there are many charitable, literary and scientific ventures that as
an incident to their success require changes in the law. A charity may need a
special charter allowing it to receive larger gifts than the general laws allow. It
would be strained to say that for this reason it became less exclusively charitable, though much might have to be done to convince legislators....
We cannot say that the Board was without warrant in concluding that this
aspect of the League's work was not confined solely to relieving its hospital
work from legal obstacles.
Alongside this restriction on legislative activity by a charitable organization,
there had developed the principle that "lobbying" expenses were not deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. 46 This principle, established first by the Treasury, was later endorsed by the United States Supreme
Court in Textile Mills Security Corporation v. Commissioner,4 7 and again in the
48
companion cases of Cammarano v. United States and Strauss v. Commissioner.
The congressional restriction on the legislative activities of charitable organizations, first appearing in the 1934 statute, received interpretation by
the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in the case of Seasongood v.
Commissioner.49 The court of appeals held that the taxpayer's contribution to
the Hamilton County Good Government League was deductible as a charitable contribution, rejecting the Tax Court's view that the League had overstepped the statute's "lobbying" limitation. First, the court's spokesman gave a
narrow interpretation of the statutory terms "propaganda" and "attempting to
influence legislation," to exclude the unselfish efforts of the League to pro50
mote good laws for better government:
It is my view that, as used in the statute, the term [propaganda] connotes
public address with selfish or ulterior purpose and characterized by the coloring or distortion of facts....

45. Id. The reasoning of Slee has been severely criticized; see Troyer, supra note 39, at
1423-25.
46. T.D. 2137, 17 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 48, 57-58 (1915).
47. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
48. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
49. 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
50. 227 F.2d at 911, 912. See also Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959) which, in
holding a local bar association to be a charitable organization, reasoned that efforts to promote
good government and judicial reform legislation did not preclude exemption. Cf. League of
Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. CI. 1960). The Internal Revenue Service
does not distinguish between "good" and "bad" legislation. For definition of "legislation," see
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 671-56, § 763 (1972).
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So, here, the method of influencing legislation must be considered and there
is nothing in the findings of fact that either challenges the validity, the good
faith purpose, or any untoward result in the communications addressed by
the League either to its members, public opinion generally, or to legislative or
administrative officers. Nothing in the record indicates lobbying, influence
peddling or illegal or unethical pressures upon legislators. Little is disclosed
other than letters to the Governor and an appearance before a legislative
committee.
The court's spokesman then said that even if "propaganda" were to be given
a wider meaning, it was the court's conclusion that the League's "political"
activities were not "substantial" since the testimony showed that less than five
per cent of the time and effort of the League was devoted to legislative
activity. 5 1
A few years later, the Treasury's own interpretation of the statute appeared in the Regulations. 52 The Regulations state that an organization is not
"operated exclusively" for exempt purposes if it is an "action" organization. 53
The Regulations then define an "action" organization as an organization (1)
which, as a substantial part of its activities, either "contacts, or urges the public to contact," legislators to support or oppose legislation or "advocates the
adoption or rejection of legislation," (2) or which "participates or intervenes,
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition
to any candidate," (3) or whose "main or primary objective . . . may be attained only by legislation" and it "advocates or campaigns" therefore "as distinguished from engaging in nonpartisan analysis, study, or research and
making the results thereof available to the public. 5 4 The Regulations also
define "educational" as including: "The instruction of the public on subjects
useful to the individual and beneficial to the community."5 5

Moreover, the

Regulations state that: "An organization may be educational even though it
advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently
full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the
public to form an independent opinion or conclusion .... 56"
Later, 57 the Service interpreted the Regulations with commendable enlightenment to conclude that an exempt university was not engaged in prohibited legislative activity if, at the request of a legislative committee, a representative testified as an expert witness on pending legislation affecting the
organization, since the university did not initiate the action and it was unlikely
that Congress intended to deny itself access to the expert's testimony.
51.
sured
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

The IRS refuses to accept the reasoning of Seasongood as to how activities are to be meaand what amount is substantial. For definition of "substantial," see id. § 764.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3) & § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (1959).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c)(3)(i) (1959).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(I)(c)(3)(ii),(iii),(is) (1959).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(3)(i)(b) (1959).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i) (1959).
1970-2 CUM. BULL. 111.
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Only three years after the United States Supreme Court handed down its
Cammarano decision that lobbying expenditures were not deductible as business expenditures, Congress effectively limited that decision's future application by enacting in the Revenue Act of 196258 a new provision, Code section
162(e), allowing taxpayers to deduct business expenses for communicating directly with legislative bodies. (In the case of legislation "of direct interest to
the taxpayer," expenditures incurred "in direct connection with" (1) "appearances before" or communications with legislative committees or legislators, or
(2) "communication of information between the taxpayer and an organization
of which he is a member" are deductible; however, deductions for amounts
incurred "for participation in . . . any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate" or "in connection with any attempt to influence the general public
. . . with respect to legislative matters, elections, or referendums" are ex-

pressly denied.)
Thereafter, in 1968, the Committee on Exempt Organizations of the
American Bar Association's Section of Taxation recommended, and the ABA
59
later adopted this position, that the Internal Revenue Code:
[B]e amended to permit organizations which are exempt from taxation under
section 501(c)(3) . . . to engage in direct legislative activity with respect to
matters of direct interest without losing their tax exempt status and without
loss of tax deductions for contributions made to such organizations.

The ABA proposal would extend the lobbying privilege to charitable organizations similar in scope to that allowed business organizations, 60 and so would
continue to prohibit attempts to "influence the general public," or so-called
grass-roots lobbying. "Legislation of direct interest" to the organization would
include legislation directly affecting its exemption or the deduction of contributions to it, and also, in the case of "publicly-supported" organizations,
legislation directly affecting its exempt purposes. 6 ' Subsequent efforts of public charities to obtain remedial legislation in a compromise form have thus far
failed .62
D.

Information Returns; Prohibited Transactions
and Unreasonable Accumulations

The Revenue Act of 1943 first imposed the requirement of filing an
annual information return on exempt charitable organizations; however, it
excepted from this requirement religious organizations, educational organiza-

58.
59.

Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 3, 76 Stat. 960.
21 TAx LAWYER 967 (1968).
60. INT. RE'. CODE OF 195 4. § 162(e).
61. 21 TAX LAWVER 868 (1968).
62. For summary of later developments on the congressional front, see Geske, Direct Lobbying
Activities of Public Charities, 26 TAx LAWYER 305 (1973); 120 CoNG. REc. 10,175-76 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 1974).
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tions normally maintaining a regular faculty and student body, and also "publicly supported" charitable organizations. 6' The House Report explained that
the new requirement stemmed from concern that certain exempt organizations were directly competing with taxpaying businesses and expressed desire
64
to gather, from the new returns, sufficient information for remedial action.
The Revenue Act of 195065 imposed a series of further restrictions on the

exemption of charitable organizations. The Act provided for the denial of
exemption to charitable organizations engaging in certain "prohibited transactions" or "unreasonable accumulations of income"; once again, as with reference to the 1943 annual information return requirement, Congress excepted
from these restrictions religious organizations, educational organizations with
regular faculty and student body, "publicly-supported" charities, and here,
additionally, certain medical organizations.
In the House version of the bill, five categories of self-dealing transactions
between donors and their trusts or foundations were categorically prohibited:
loans to the donors, payment of more than reasonable compensation, provision of services to the donor on a preferential basis, purchase of securities or
other property from the donor, or sale of a substantial part of the
organization's property to the donor. 66 The Senate Finance Committee, however, modified the House version to prohibit these categories of self-dealing
transactions only when not carried on at "arm's length. ' 67 It explained: "Your
committee is in sympathy with the goals sought by the above provisions of the
68
House bill but believes they would be unduly harsh in their application.
Thus, in the final version, 6 9 loans to the donor were prohibited only if made
"without adequate security and a reasonable rate of interest" and sales of
property to or from the donor were subject to an "adequate consideration"
test. The final version also included a general prohibition, added by the
Senate committee, of transactions resulting in a "substantial diversion" of the
organization's funds to the donor or related parties.
The House bill also would have imposed a tax, with certain exceptions, on
"accumulated investment income," i.e., "income not paid out on or before the
15th day of the third month following the close of the taxable year in which
the income is received." 7 The House Ways and Means Committee explained
its position thus:

71

63. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 117, 58 Stat. 21.
64. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1943).
65. Ch. 994, §§ 301-22, 64 Stat. 906.
66. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1950).
67. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950).
68. Id. at 37.
69. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 3813; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 502 [INT. REV. CODE OF 1939
and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 are hereinafter cited respectively as 1939 CODE and 1954 CODE].
70. H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 66, at 40.

71.

Id.

Page 6: Autumn 1975]

CHARITIES

Your committee's studies have revealed that in a number of cases charitable,
etc., organizations have obtained the concessions granted under existing law
without distributing a substantial portion of their current income for exempt
purposes. In some of these cases the time when charity can expect to benefit
appears extremely remote. In the opinion of your committee the taxexemption privileges with respect to investment income should be restricted
to that portion of the income which those organizations demonstrate that they
are using to fulfill their charitable, etc., purposes by actual distribution to
charity as the income is received by them.
The Senate Finance Committee once again rejected the House proposal as
being too harsh.

72

Your committee has rejected this accumulations tax and substituted for it the
requirement that information disclosing the extent of accumulations must be
made available to the public. Your committee does not question the contention that some organizations are abusing their tax-exempt privilege by undesirable accumulations of income. However, witnesses before, and statements
presented to, your committee brought out quite clearly that the measure
passed by the House was too inflexible and as a result would seriously injure
many worth-while educational and charitable projects.
The information requirement, said the Senate Report, would accomplish the
dual purpose of "encourage[ing] distributions" and of "reveal[ing] the extent
of the accumulations problem.1

73

The Senate provision requiring an expanded annual information return
(to include gross income, expenses, disbursements for exempt purposes out of
income and principal, prior aggregate accumulations, and balance sheet) was
adopted.7 1 In lieu of the House-proposed tax on investment accumulations
the Conference Committee substituted (without any explanation) a new provision denying the exemption to certain categories of charities (the same ones
covered by the "prohibited transactions" provision, i.e., in general, private
foundations) in the event that the charity's accumulations from the taxable
year or prior years are (1) "unreasonable in amount or duration" in order to
carry out its exempt purposes, or (2) "are used to a substantial degree" for
non-exempt purposes, or (3) "are invested" so "as to jeopardize the carrying
7
out" of its exempt purpose.
E.

1950-1969

The period beginning after the passage of the Revenue Act of 1950 and
extending up to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 did not bring a
great deal of change to the basic provisions in the tax statute affording tax

72. S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at 34.
73. Id. at 34-35.
74. 1939 CODE § 153(a) (now 1954 CODE § 6033(b)).
75. 1939 CODE § 3814 (reenacted as 1954 CODE § 504 until its repeal by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(j)(15), 83 Stat. 487).
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exemption to charitable organizations. The Internal Revenue Code of 19546
did add "testing for public safety" to the exempt purposes listed in section
77
501(c)(3); this addition originated in the Senate Finance Committee.
An amendment introduced by then Senator Lyndon Johnson on the
Senate floor added to the exemption provision the requirement that a charitable organization not engage in political activity; that is, not "participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. ' 78 The reason for
79
this addition was not explained.
The period between the passage of the Revenue Act of 1950 and the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 did, however, bring a series of governmental investigations of one particular class of charitable organizations, namely private
80
foundations.
F.

Cox Committee

The Select Committee to Investigate Foundations and other Organizations,
known as the Cox Committee, was created by a House resolution in 1952
and:8 '
[D]irected to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of educational and philanthropic foundations and other comparable organizations
which are exempt from Federal income taxation to determine which such
foundations and organizations are using their resources for purposes other
than the purposes for which they were established, and especially to determine which such foundations . . .are using their resources for un-American
and subversive activities or for purposes not in the interest or tradition of the
United States....
On the central issue of whether foundations had been "infiltrated by communists" or had disbursed funds to "subversive individuals and organiza2
tions," the Cox Committee Report concluded:
The foundations, for the most part, have made no secret of their mistakes,
and have stated frankly that in recent years they have recognized the increasing need to be constantly alert to avoid giving unintended aid to subversives.
The Committee believes that on balance the record of the foundations is
good. It believes that there was infiltration and that judgments were made
which, in the light of hindsight, were mistakes, but it also believes that many
of these mistakes were made without the knowledge of facts which, while later
Ch. 736, 68A Stat. l.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1954).
1954 CODE § 501(c)(3); Clark, supra note 40, at 445 n. 29.
100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954); Clark, supra note 40, at 445 n. 29.
For a discussion of these investigations, see M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND
GOVERNMENT 358-80 (1965).
81. H.R. RES. 561, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CONG. REC. 3489 (1952).
82. SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE FOUNDATIONS, FINAL REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 2514, 82d
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1953).
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obtainable, could not have been readily ascertained at the time decisions were
taken.
The Cox Committee declined to consider the issues of the use of foundations
for family control of corporations and as devices for "tax avoidance and tax
evasion," but did consider these issues "of sufficient importance to warrant
inquiry by the Ways and Means Committee. 8 3 The Cox Committee's report
did, however, recommend that "[p]ublic accounting . . . be required of all
foundations," and included a proposed amendment of the tax statute, adding
84
to the items required on the annual information return.
G.

Reece Committee

In July of 1953, the House created another committee, the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, known as the Reece Committee, to conduct a study of foundations; this
committee was directed to focus once again on whether foundations were
using funds for "subversive activities" and also to focus on the use of funds
' 5
for "political purposes; propaganda, or attempts to influence legislation."1
In the "Summary of Committee Findings" the majority of the Reece
Committee painted a picture of a tremendously powerful "interlock" of foun86
dations, exerting their influence in dangerous ways.
[T]here is such a concentration of foundation power in the United States,
operating in the social sciences and education. It consists basically of a group
of major foundations, representing a gigantic aggregrate of capital and income....
A professional class of administrators of foundations funds has emerged....
It has already come to exercise a very extensive, practical control over most
research in the social sciences, much of our educational process, and a good
part of government administration in these and related fields....
Associated with the excessive support of the empirical method, the concentration of power has tended to support the dangerous "cultural lag" theory and
to promote "moral relativity", to the detriment of our basic moral, religious,
and governmental principles.
[T]he concentration has shown a distinct tendency to favor political opinions to the left. These foundations and their intermediaries engage extensively in political activity, not in the form of direct support of political candidates or political parties, but in the conscious promotion of carefully calculated political concepts ....

83. Id. at 13.
84. Id. at 13-15.
85.
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With several tragically outstanding exceptions . . . foundations have not directly supported organizations which, in turn, operated to support Communism. However, some of the larger foundations have directly supported
"subversion" in the true meaning of that term, namely, the process of undermining some of our vitally protected concepts and principles.
At the conclusion of its report, which elaborated on this description of foundations placed in the summary of findings, the majority made several
recommendations: 7 (1) IRS's manpower be increased to "more closely watch
foundation activity,"8 s (2) foundations be limited to an existence of ten to
twenty-five years, 9 (3) the "accumulations" rules be changed to require that
foundations distribute all of each year's income, including capital gains, within
two or three years,9" (4) restrictions be placed on "corporation-created
foundations,"9' 1 (5) the Ways and Means Committee "consider the advisability
of denying tax exemption to any foundation which holds more than five or
'
(6) the wordten per cent of its capital in the securities of one enterprise,"92
ing of the tax statute be changed to provide for "the complete exclusion of
political activity, leaving it to the courts to apply the maxim of de minimis non
94
curat lex, ' 93 and (7) the area of lobbying by foundations be investigated.
In the 1960's two further governmental studies of private foundations
were made: one by Congressman Wright Patman, as Chairman of the Select
Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, and another
by the Treasury.
H.

Patman Committee

After carrying out a "preliminary survey" with requests for information
sent to over 500 foundations, Congressman Patman submitted to his Committee an Interim Report in 1962. 9 5 The Report began by stating that "[t]here is
a pressing need for an immediate moratorium on the granting of tax exemptions to foundations." 96 The reasons cited in support were (1) the "laxness" of
the IRS, (2) "violations of law and Treasury Regulations by far too many" of
the foundations surveyed, (3) loss of enormous amounts of tax revenue, (4) the "rapidly increasing concentration of economic power in foun87.
88.
89.

Id. at 212-22.
Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214.

90.

Id. at 214-15.

91.

Id. at 215.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 217.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 220.
M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 80, at 365.
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dations," and (5) the competitive threat to small business posed by
"foundation-controlled enterprises. '97 The report closed with a series of seventeen recommendations, 9" including: a twenty-five year limit on a
foundation's life; a prohibition on foundations' "engaging in business directly or indirectly," owning more than three per cent of a corporation's
stock, or voting stock, or engaging in commercial money lending or borrowing; the taxing as "unrelated business income" of profits "from trading or
speculating in securities, as distinguished from passive investment"; and the
inclusion of contributions, of capital gains and of "amounts unreasonably accumulated in corporations controlled by a foundation" in computing the
foundation's accumulation of income. Congressman Patman also made suggestions in the area of the deduction for charitable contributions; he proposed that a taxpayer not be allowed to deduct contributions to a foundation
he controls until the "foundation actually uses the money for charity," and
that contributions of property be valued at the lower of cost or value. In the
area of tax administration, Patman proposed closer review of applications for
exemption, greater disclosure on foundations' tax returns including business
activities, political activities, and advertising, and revocation of exemption for
insufficient reporting.
In 1963, Congressman Patman issued the second installment of his report,
which related to the business dealings of various foundations controlled
by industrialist David G. Baird, 99 and in 1964 he issued a third installment relating to the estate of Alfred Dupont and its affiliate, the Nemours
Foundation.'"°
I.

Treasury Report on Private Foundations

Upon the request in 1964 of the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee, the Treasury Department undertook a
study of private foundations, surveying approximately 1,300 foundations, before submitting its report in 1965.'01 Early in the report, the Treasury stated
its conclusion that "prompt and effective action to end the specific abuses
extant among foundations is preferable to a general limitation upon foundation lives."'10 2 The body of the report was devoted primarily to six major problems. In the first area, self-dealing, Treasury suggested that the "arms-length"
standard of the 1950 Revenue Act was ineffective to prevent abuses and recommended "legislative rules patterned on the total prohibitions of the 1950
97. Id.
98. Id. at 133-35.
99. M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 80, at 370.
100. Id. at 370-71.
101. Id. at 374-75.
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House bill." 103 Treasury also asserted that the "indefinite" standards of the
"accumulation of income" provisions of the 1950 Revenue Act had been ineffective to deal with the problem of delay in benefits to charity; it recommended instead that private foundations be required to expend an amount
"equal either to actual foundation net income or to a fixed percentage of
foundation asset value, whichever is greater" for "active charitable operations
. . . on a reasonably current basis."' 0 4 Treasury further recommended that,
after a reasonable transition period, no foundation be permitted to own
"either directly or through stock holdings, 20 percent or more of a business
unrelated to . . . [its] charitable activities."1 0 5 In the area of "family use of
foundations to control corporate and other property," Treasury recommended that:"0
[W]here the donor and related parties maintain control of a business or other
property after the contribution of an interest in it to a private foundation, no
income tax deduction would be permitted for the gift until (a) the foundation
disposes of the contributed asset, (b) the foundation devotes the property to
active charitable operations, or (c) donor control over the business or property
terminates.
As to the problem of "financial transactions unrelated to charitable functions,"
Treasury's recommendations included a prohibition on all borrowing by
foundations for investment purposes, a prohibition on foundations' engaging
in "trading activities and speculative practices," and a limitation of foundation
loans to types "clearly necessary, safe, and appropriate for charitable
fiduciaries." ' 0 7 In the sixth problem area, "broadening of foundation management," the Treasury proposed that donors and related parties not be allowed to constitute over 25 per cent of the foundation's governing body
after the first twenty-five years of the foundation's existence.""'
J.

Definition of "Charitable"

The term "charitable" used by Congress in the federal income tax exemption provisions (including present section 501(c)(3)) has never been given any
statutory definition by Congress. In Regulations I 11, the following brief elaboration appeared:""'
Corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes
comprise, in general, organizations for the relief of the poor. The fact that a
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

6.
6-7.
7.
8.
9.

108.

Id. at 9.

109. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.101(6)-(1) (1943). This passage remained unchanged when
§ 29.101(6)-(1) was amended by T.D. 5924, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 181 & T.D. 5928, 1952-2 CUM.
BULL. 100.
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corporation established for the relief of indigent persons may receive voluntary contributions f-om the persons intended to be relieved will not necessar-

ily deprive it of exemption.
Thus the Treasury at this point defined charity in the narrow, popular sense
of aid to the poor and suffering.
In a 1958 article entitled "What is a Charitable Organization," Herman T.
Reiling, then Assistant Chief Counsel of the IRS, argued that Congress had
used the term in the statute "in its generally accepted legal sense," which was
"broad and comprehensive." 1 ' Reiling cautioned against restricting "charitable" to its popular meaning of aid to the poor and suffering, thus omitting
1
from consideration public works, such as public recreational facilities."
The following year, the Treasury published Regulation section 1.501
(c)(3)- 1 ,12 which included a definition of "charitable." Following the view advocated by Reiling, the new Regulation stated that "charitable" was meant by
Congress in its "generally accepted legal sense." After noting that the term
was not intended to be limited by the listing of the other descriptive terms
("religious," "literary," "educational," and "scientific,") in section 501(c)(3), nor
by the definitions of charity in the case-law, the Regulation listed the various
aspects of charity traditionally considered part of its legal meaning and then
modernized the definition by adding its own new category. The Regulation
reads: 113
Charitable defined.-The term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in
its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as
limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt
purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed
by judicial decisions. Such term includes: Relief of the poor and distressed or
of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education
or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or
works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i)
to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
Like Reiling, the Treasury considered it to be a requirement of exemption
'
that an organization "serve[s] a public rather than a private interest." 4
Experience to date demonstrates that the definition of "charity" in the
current Treasury Regulations is proving broad enough to accomodate developments of the term to satisfy changing needs of our society. Three examples will show how well this expanded definition has worked in practice,
namely, with -hospitals," "private schools," and "public interest law firms."
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Reiling, What is a CharitableOrganization, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 526-27 (1958).
Id. at 528.
1959-2 CuM. BULL. 139.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(2) (1959).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (1959).
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(The question of whether, or under what circumstances, a hospital can qualify
as a "charitable" organization is discussed in another article in this volume.)
The issue of eligibility of segregated private schools for exemption provided a tough test for the broad definition of charity in the 1959 Regulation.
After suspending action on exemption applications filed by apparently segregated private schools since October 15, 1965, the Service announced on August 2, 1967 that a school's racially discriminatory policy would be a basis for
denying exemption only where "State action for constitutional purposes" was
1 5
found. 1

This IRS policy was challenged in a class action, in which plaintiffs, black
parents of students attending Mississippi public schools, sought to enjoin the
Service from according tax-exempt status and deductibility of contributions to
Mississippi private schools practicing discrimination against black students.
About six months after the granting of a preliminary injunction on January
12, 1970,116 the IRS announced in two July news releases 1 7 that it could "no
longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status" or eligibility to receive taxdeductible contributions "to private schools which practice racial discrimination."' 1 8
The rationale for the Service's new position is more fully explained in
Revenue Ruling 71-447,1i9 which stated that a school seeking to qualify as an
"educational" organization must be a "common law" charity;1 2 0 that according
to common law concepts a charitable trust, educational or otherwise, must not
have a purpose which is illegal or contrary to public policy; and that due to
the federal public policy against racial discrimination in education, private
segregated schools cannot meet this common-law test, under section 501(c)(3).
On June 30, 1971, the district court granted plaintiffs declaratory relief' 2 '
(a declaration that only private schools with a "racially non-discriminatory policy as to students" could qualify under sections 501(c)(3) and 170(a)-(c)), and a
permanent injunction enjoining the Commissioner from approving applications for tax-exempt status or for deductibility of contributions as to Mississippi private schools, unless the schools had made a showing of a racially
nondiscriminatory policy, under certain specified procedures, stricter than
those required by the Service in its July news releases.' 22
115.
116.
117.

7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6734.
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
IRS News Releases (July 10, 1970), No. 1052 (July 19, 1970), 7 CCH 1970 STAND.
TAX. REP.
6790, 6814.
118. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 6790.

FED.

119.

1971-2 CUM. BULL. 230.

120.

See also testimony of Randolph W. Thrower, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in Hear-

ings on S. Res. 359 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d

Sess. 1995 (1970).
121.
122.

Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
The IRS thereafter published Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 834, providing pri-
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In supporting its interpretation of the Code, the court first stated that
there was "at least a grave doubt whether an educational organization that
practices racial discrimination can qualify as a charitable trust under general
trust law." It noted that charitable trusts must satisfy society's changing conception of "benefit to the community," and it also noted the increasing tendency of courts to view racial restrictions in charitable trusts as "against public
policy.' 23 The court, however, chose not to apply a "common law
approach"'2 4 in interpreting the Code, but instead based its interpretation on
2 5
the "Federal public policy against support for racial segregation of schools.'
Another interesting area of controversy over the definition of "charitable" involved eligibility of a "public interest law firm" for tax exemption and
receipt of charitable contributions. The controversy was set in motion on October 9, 1970 when the Service announced in a news release that it had "temporarily suspended" the issuance of tax-exemption rulings to "public interest
law firms," pending a "study" of the issue.12 6 The Service cited as a problem
the "lack of standards or controls" applicable to a litigant's claim to be "acting
in the public interest." This news release precipitated a stream of protest in
the newspapers, and within a few days, on October 14, 1970, the members of
the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty sent a let2 7
ter to Commissioner Randolph W. Thrower objecting to the IRS action.'
The Commissioner soon responded to such criticism by the publication on
November 12, 1970 of guidelines under which the Service would issue advance rulings to public interest law firms (pending amendment of the Regulation defining "charitable" to "clarify the treatment" of such firms).12 8 The
news release explained that special guidelines for public interest law firms
were necessary because there was no "clear set of precedents" recognizing as
charitable the legal representation of the "interests of a majority of the public,
as distinguished from legal representation for a disadvantaged minority, such
as the poor, the victims of racial discrimination, or those denied human and
civil rights either in criminal or civil matters." (These latter categories all appear in the 1959 Regulation's definition of "charitable.")
vate schools with guidelines for "adequately" publicizing their racially nondiscriminatory policies.
On February 18, 1975, the IRS published in the Federal Register (40 Fed. Reg. 6991) a proposed
Revenue Procedure intended to establish "more specific guidelines" and also recordkeeping requirements for determining whether private schools have racially nondiscriminatory policies. 40
Fed. Reg. at 6992; 9 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6398. Announcement 75-20, 1975 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 10, at 62, invited comments on the proposed Procedure. The Procedure, somewhat modified, was issued in final form as Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 49, at 46.

123. 330 F. Supp. at 1159-60.
124. 330 F. Supp. at 1161.
125. Id.
126. IRS News Release No. 1069 (Oct. 9, 1970), 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6937E.
127. Garrett, Federal Tax Limitations on Political Activities of Public Interest and Educational
Organizations, 59 GEo. L.J. 561, 575-76 (1971).
128. IRS News Release No. 1078 (Nov. 12. 1970). 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6943G: Rev. Proc. 39. 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 575.
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Guideline number one contained the central requirement of litigation serv1 29
ing "a broad public interest":
The engagement of the organization in litigation can reasonably be said to
be in representation of a broad public interest rather than a private interest.
The litigation is designed to present a position on behalf of the public at large
on matters of public interest. Typical of such litigation may be class actions in
the public interest, suits for injunction against action by government or private interests broadly affecting the public, similar representation before administrative boards and agencies, test suits where the private interest is small,
and the like.
In furtherance of this first requirement, the Guidelines called for an explanation of how the firm's cases "would benefit the public generally" to be included in the firm's annual information return, and also required that the
firm's policy and program decisions be the "responsibility" of a board "representative of the public interest." The Guidelines left the public interest law
firms in uncertainty as to permissible fees, stating only that the firms must not
accept fees "except in accordance with procedures approved by I.R.S."
The recent slackening off of foundation grants to public interest law firms
has increased the urgency of the "fee" issue for such firms.130 While refusing
to permit the charging or acceptance of fees from clients,' 3 1 the IRS has recently ruled that public interest firms may accept attorneys' fees, from opposing parties, awarded by a court or administrative agency or provided in a
settlement agreement approved by such a tribunal. Such fees may, however,
defray no more than 50 per cent of the firm's total costs of legal functions,
calculated over a five-year period.1 3 2 Meanwhile legislation under which
judges could award legal fees to successful "public interest" plaintiffs from
general Treasury funds has been sponsored in the Senate by California
Democrat John V. Tunney.

133

II
HISTORY OF CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

A.

Early History

The first provision in the income tax law for a deduction by individuals of
contributions to charitable organizations appeared in the War Revenue Act of
129.
130.
cember
131.

Id.
Kuttner, I.R.S. Has Liberalized Rules on Public Interest Law Fees, Washington Post, De26, 1974, at C-13.
Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 10, at 9; see Kuttner, supra note 130.

132. Rev,. Rul. 75-76, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10, at 9; Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 10, at 46; 28 TAX LAWYER 410-11 (1975); see Kutner, supra note 130. In its most recent ruling regarding fees, the IRS held that a public interest law firm may not retain a private
attornev under an arrangement that if a court awards attorneys' fees the organization will be
reimbursed for the amount it paid to the private attorney and the private attorney will keep any
excess. Rev. Rul. 76-5, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, at 12.
133. See Kutner, supra note 130.
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1917.134 This new provision read as follows: 1

5

Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit
of any private stockholder or individual, to an amount not in excess of fifteen
per centum of the taxpayer's taxable net income as computed without the
benefit of this subparagraph. Such contributions or gifts shall be allowable as
deductions only if verified under rules and regulations prescribed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
Such a deduction was touted by its supporters as necessary for the preservation of charitable institutions in wartime.' l3
Indeed, an attempt to include
13 7
such a deduction in the Revenue Act of 1913 had been unsuccessful.
It is interesting to note that from the beginning the charitable deduction
has been a self contained provision rather than being tied-in by cross reference to the charitable exemption provision. Thus, these provisions have never
been necessarily coextensive. For example, an organization organized and operated exclusively for "testing for public safety" qualifies for charitable
exemption; 3 8 however, it is not eligible to receive deductible charitable
3 9

contributions.1

The Revenue Act of 1918140 brought a couple of changes to the charitable
deduction provision. First, the phrase "contributions or gifts actually made
within the year" was modified to read "contributions or gifts made within the
taxable year." Also added was a special restriction on contributions by nonresident aliens limiting the deduction to gifts to "domestic corporations.' 1 4' The
Revenue Act of 1918 also enacted for the first time an estate tax deduction
1 42
for bequests to charitable organizations.
The Revenue Act of 1921143 modified both the charitable deduction and
the charitable exemption provisions to include "literary" among the charitable
purposes and to expand the categories of organizations eligible for exemption
and for deductible contributions to include, as well as corporations, any
134.
135.

Ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300.
Act of 1917, ch. 63, Title XII, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300.

136. J.

SEIDMAN,

SEIDMAN'S

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY
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FEDERAL

INCOME

TAX

LAWS

1938-1861, at 944-45 (1938); 55 CONG. REC. 6728-29 (1971). Senator Hollis, the amendment's
sponsor, explained that the heavy war taxes would absorb the surplus funds of the wealthy, which
were ordinarily contributed to charities. In addition, many colleges would be losing their students
to the military. 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1971).
137. J. SEIDMAN, stupra note 136, at 945.
138. 1954 CODE § 501(c)(3).
139. 1954 CODE § 170(c).
140. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
141. Ch. 18, § 214(a)(I 1), 40 Stat. 1057 (emphasis added).

142. Ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057.
143.

Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.

[Vol. 39: No. 4

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

"community chest, fund, or foundation. 1 44 Also modified was the special restriction on deductions by nonresident aliens to allow only gifts "made to
domestic corporations, or to community chests, funds, or foundations, created
in the United States."
In the Revenue Act of 1924, Senate amendments accounted for two
changes in the charitable deduction provision.1 45 The category of eligible
charitable organizations was expanded to include a "trust." And the so-called
"unlimited deduction" was enacted to remedy the plight of an heiress-nun,
who had taken a vow of poverty. 146 This new exception to the 15 per cent
limitation on charitable deductions was allowed a taxpayer whose charitable
contributions in the taxable year and in each of the ten preceding years exceeded 90 per cent of net income for that year. 14 7 The Senate Report states
that the "provision is designed substantially to free from income taxation one
who is habitually contributing to benevolent organizations amiLounts equalling
48
virtually his entire income.''"

The first federal gift tax, also enacted in the Revenue Act of 1924, provided a deduction for charitable contributions."' 9 In 1926 the gift tax was
repealed, but when reenacted in the Revenue Act of 1932,', ° it continued a
deduction for charitable gifts. In 1928 the "unlimited deduction" was modified to include not only charitable contributions, but also the "amount of
income, war-profits, or excess-profits taxes paid during such year," in the
"90% of net income" measurement. 151
The Revenue Act of 1934152 imposed the so-called "lobbying restriction"
upon charitable organizations, as a condition of eligibility to receive deductible
contributions and as a condition of the exemption. (See Part I for further
history of this provision.)
B.

Deduction for Corporations

Corporations first obtained the privilege of taking deductions for charitable contributions in the Revenue Act of 1935.153 The deduction of corporations was limited (then as now) to five per cent of the corporation's income.
144.

Ch. 136, §§ 214(a)( 1), 231(6), 42 Stat. 227.

145.
146.

H.R. REP. No. 844 (Conference Comm.), 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1924).
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 214(a)(10), 43 Stat. 253; Baker, The Tax Treatment of

Charitable Contribution Deductions Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
TAX INSTITUTE 327, 330 (1971).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Ch. 234, § 214(a)(10), 43 Stat. 253.
S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1924).
Ch. 234, § 321(a)(2), 43 Stat. 243.
Ch. 209, 47 Stat. 169.
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 120, 45 Stat. 791.
Ch. 277, §§ 23(o)(2), 101(6), 48 Stat. 680.
Ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1014.
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The deduction was only allowed for contributions to a "domestic corporation,
or domestic trust, or domestic community chest, fund, or foundation," and
there was the following parenthetical further limitation: "(but in the case of
contributions or gifts to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation, only if such contributions or gifts are to be used within the United States exclusively for such
purposes)."' 5 4
The House Ways and Means Committee apparently had rejected a provision for such a deduction. The minority report complained of this omission in
that time of depression:

155

We deem it a mistake not to have provided an exemption from the corporation income tax on gifts made by corporations to community chests and
other charities. It is the announced policy of the administration to throw the
burden of caring for unemployables back on the States and local communities. When this occurs there are two ways they can be provided for. One
is by direct taxation on the people of the local communities through taxation
of homes, farms, and other real estate; the other is through private charity. If
corporations are public spirited enough to make contributions to charities, we
believe their contributions for such purposes should be exempt from taxation
exactly as is done in the case of individuals.
The bill apparently left the House with such a provision. The Senate accepted
this new deduction privilege and added "or the prevention of cruelty to children" to the allowable purposes of the eligible organizations; and the House
56
agreed to this addition.
C.

"Foreign-Charity" Restriction

In the Revenue Act of 1938,157 Congress restricted the charitable deduction of individuals to include only contributions to "domestic" organizations,
thus bringing the individual deduction further (though not entirely) into line
with the corporate deduction, in this regard. The House Report explained
1 58
this new limited restriction as follows:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. The United States derives no such benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is consistent with the above theory. If the recipient, however, is a
domestic organization the fact that some portion of its funds is used in other
154. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014. This restriction does not apply in
case the charity is a corporation; see Rev. Rul. 80, 1969-1 Cu.NL BULL. 65. This is certainly a trap
for the unwary.
155. H.R. RrP. No. 1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935).
156. S. REP. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1885 (Conference
Comm.), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1935).
157. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447.
158. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19-20 (1938).
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countries for charitable and other purposes (such as missionary and educational purposes) will not affect the deductibility of the gift.
The 1938 Act also provided a clearer timing rule for the charitable deduction by changing the old language, "contributions or gifts made within the
taxable year," to the phrase "contributions or gifts payment of which is made
'
within the taxable year." 159
The House Report explains that confusion had
arisen, especially as to the time when an accrual basis taxpayer could deduct
an as-yet-unpaid charitable pledge, and that this confusion was "aggravated"
by the uncertain and diverse state law as to the liability of a subscriber to a
60
charitable fund. 1
In addition, the House version of the 1938 Act proposed that, in the case
of a contribution made in property other than money, the allowable deduction should be equal only to the adjusted basis of the property in the
taxpayer's hands, or to its fair market value, whichever was lower. (Under the
administrative rule then in force, the donor could deduct the property's value
at the time of the gift.) l"' The House Report explained the reason for this
proposal as follows: "There is no justification in principle for the allowance of
a deduction for the amount of unrealized appreciation which has never been
included in taxable income ....
-162 This House provision, however, was rejected by the Senate. The Senate Report explained that the bill's potential
chilling effect on contributions of appreciated property was feared: 163
Representations were made to the committee by officials of educational and
charitable institutions that the effect of such a provision would be to discourage the making of charitable gifts in kind. The committee believes that charitable gifts generally ought to be encouraged and so has eliminated this provision of the House bill.
In the Revenue Act of 1939,164 the organizations eligible to receive deductible contributions from individuals or corporations was expanded from
"domestic" organizations to include organizations "created or organized in, or
under the laws of, any possession of the United States. ' 165 The phraseology of
the provisions was also modified, so that under section 23(o)(2), the provision
for charitable deductions by individuals now read: 166
A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation, created or
organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under the law
159. Ch. 289, § 23(o), 52 Stat. 447.
160. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938).
161. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(o)-(1), I.T. 3910, 1948-1 CUM. BULL. 15; Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.23(o)-I, Rev. Rul. 138. 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 223.
162. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19-20 (1938).
163. S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1938).
164. Ch. 247, § 224(a) (modifying 1939 CODE § 23(o)(2)) and § 224(b) (modifying 1939 CODE
§ 2 3 (q)), 53 Stat. 862.
165. S. REP. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1939) (emphasis added).
166. Ch. 247, § 224(a), 53 Stat. 862 (now 1954 CODE § 170(c)(2)(A)).
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of the United States or of any State or territory or of any possession of the
United States ....
(The deduction for corporations also was modified by allowing contributions
16 7
"used within the United States or any of its possessions.")'
Two revenue rulings issued by the IRS in the 1960's provided guidelines
for determining the deductibility of contributions to a domestic organization
which then transmits the funds to a foreign charity. The Service noted that
the foreign-charity restriction would be undermined if contributions "inevitably committed to go to a foreign organization were held to be deductible
solely because . . . they came to rest momentarily in a . . . domestic
organization."' 6 And it warned that a domestic organization receiving contributions would be deemed "only nominally the donee"'' 69 in cases where it
transmitted the funds to a foreign charity either (1) as the creature of the
foreign charity, (2) by requirement of its charter, or (3) merely by agreement,
if it represented, during its solicitations, that the contributions would go to
the foreign charity. Amplification of the earlier ruling, however, stated that
the mere solicitation by a domestic organization of funds for specific projects
of a foreign charity would not preclude the deductibility of contributions, so
long as the domestic organization's charter required that such solicitation be
(1) preceded by board approval of the planned project grants and (2) conditioned on the domestic charity's retention of control as to use of the funds,
70
including the right to cancel the project grants.1
In contrast to the income tax provision, the charitable deduction provision
of the estate tax statute applicable to estates of citizens or residents 7 ' contains
no comparable language disallowing contributions to foreign charities or for
foreign use. The Treasury Regulation explicitly states that the deduction is
"not limited . . . to transfers to domestic corporations or associations, or to
trustees for use within the United States."' 7 2 Moreover, the IRS has ruled,
very recently, that a charitable bequest to a foreign government or political
subdivision is deductible under section 2055 so long as its use is limited to
exclusively charitable purposes within the meaning of sections 2055(a)(2) and
2055(a)(3). 173
Similarly, the gift tax statute places no "foreign-charity" or "foreign-use"
restriction on its charitable deduction, in the case of gifts by citizens or

167.

Ch. 247, § 224(b), 53 Stat. 862 (now § contained in last sentence of 1954

CODE

§ 170(c)(2)) (emphasis added).
168. Rev. Rul. 252, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 101, 104.
169. Id.
170. Rev. Rut. 79, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 48. See Rev. Rut. 75-65. 1975 lNT. REv. BuLL. No.
at 5.
171.
172.

173.

1954 CoDE§ 2055.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1(a) (1958).
Rev. Rut. 74-523, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 43, at 29.
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residents.' 7 4 This absence of restriction in the case of citizen or resident
donors is made explicit in Regulations section 25.2522(a)-l(a).
However, Congress has imposed such "foreign-use, foreign-charity" restrictions in the case of estates of nonresident aliens and in the case of nonresident alien donors, though the restrictions do not entirely parallel the
income tax restrictions. The charitable contributions of nonresident alien decedents or donors are only deductible when made to (1) "a domestic corporation" or (2) " a trust, or community chest, fund or foundation" (in the case of
the gift tax) or a "trustee or trustees, or a fraternal society" (in the case of the
estate tax), if the contribution is "to be used within the United States" exclu1
sively for charitable purposes. 7
D.

1940-1954

The Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 brought a change in the computation of an individual's charitable deduction.' 7 6 Before passage of this act, a
deduction was allowed up to "15 per centum of the taxpayer's net income as
computed without the benefit of this subsection or of subsection (x).' u 7 As
amended, the statute allowed a deduction up to "15 per centum of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income.'1 7 8 The new provision was explained in the
House Report as follows: "This has the effect of increasing the allowance for
charitable contributions, and will enable the taxpayer to compute his charita79
ble deduction without having to determine his net income."'
In 1949, amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939180 liberalized
the rules with respect to the time of payment for corporations seeking to
make deductible charitable contributions. Under the new provision, an
accrual-basis corporation was allowed if it filed the proper election, until the
fifteenth day after the end of its taxable year for payment of a charitable
contribution, authorized by its board during the year.' 8' The House Report
explained that the provision would aid corporations which "intended to make
the maximum charitable contributions allowable as deductions" but which
have had "difficulty in determining before the end of the taxable year what
174. However, contributions to war veterans' organizations are only deductible if such organizations "are organized in the United States or any of its possessions." 1954 CODE § 2522(a)(4).
175. 1954 CODE §§ 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii),(iii) (estate tax), 2522(b)(2),(3) (gift tax). As noted earlier,
the Revenue Act of 1918 restricted the income tax charitable deduction for nonresident aliens to
gifts made to "domestic corporations." Id. § 214(a)(1 1).
176. Ch. 210, 58 Stat. 231.
177. 1939 ConE § 23(o), as last amended by the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798,
§ 127(c) to include the phrase "or of subsection (x)." Subsection 23(x) related to "medical, dental
etc. expenses."
178. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, § 8(b), 58 Stat. 231.
179. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944).
180. Act of October 25, 1949, ch. 720, 63 Stat. 891.
181. Id. § 3(a).
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constitutes 5 percent of their net income."'' 8 2
In 1952, Congress raised the ceiling on deductions by individuals for
3
charitable contributions from 15 to 20 per cent of adjusted gross income.,
In explaining this provision (which originated as an amendment in the Senate Finance Conmmittee), the Senate Report expressed particular concern for
the financial "plight" of colleges and educational institutions, in words that
18 4
by now have a familiar ring:
Your committee is of the opinion that by increasing the 15-percent limit to
20-percent, much-needed relief will be given to colleges, hospitals, and other
organizations who are becoming more and more dependent upon private contributors to enable them to balance their budgets and carry on their programs. The plight in which many of our educational institutions find themselves at the present time is due to the fact that their endowment income is
inadequate to meet rising costs. It is only through supplemental gifts by the
alumni or other persons interested in the cause of education that they are
able to continue their programs. Many of the smaller colleges whose alumni
have not sufficient means to make adequate contributions are able to continue
their existence only through gifts or contributions received by [sic] one or two
prominent families in their community. Your committee believes that it is to
the best interest of the communitv to encourage private contributions to these
institutions and it is believed that this amendment will provide some assistance in this respect.
E.

Internal Revenue Code of 1954

With the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the ceiling on
an individual's deductions for charitable contributions was raised once again,
but only as to a limited and select group of charities (thus introducing discrimination as to the type of charitable organization being supported). In addition to the "20% percent" allowance already provided in 1952, the taxpayer
was now granted an extra 10% per cent allowance for charitable contributions
to any of three specific types of charitable organizations: 185
1) "a church or a convention or association of churches,"
2) "an educational organization which normally maintains a regular faculty
and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly
carried on; or"
3) "a hospital referred to in Sec. 503(b)(5)."
The latter two categories were defined by reference to then section 503(b),
which exempted these and certain other categories of charitable organizations
8 6
from the "prohibited transactions" provisions.
182. H.R. REP. No. 920, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).
183. Act of July 8, 1952, ch. 588, § 4(a), 66 Stat. 442.
184. S. REP. No. 1584, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
185. 1954 CODE § 170(b)(1)(A)(i),(ii),(iii).
186. Before the amendment of 1954 CODE § 503(a)(1) and the repeal of former 1954 CODE
§ 503(b),(e), there was an explicit statutory linkage between the charitable deduction and the
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The reasons for allowing an extra ten per cent of deductions for contributions to these three categories of charitable organizations is but scantly explained in the Committee Reports, which only state: "This amendment by
your committee is designed to aid these institutions in obtaining the additional
funds they need, in view of their rising costs and the relatively low rate of
return they are receiving on endowment funds."'8 7
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relaxed the test of eligibility for the
"unlimited charitable deduction."' 8 8 The statute's former requirement that
charitable contributions plus income tax total 90 per cent of the individual's
income in each of the last 10 years was considered "unduly strict" by the Ways
and Means Committee. 8 5 The House Committee's bill provided that the 90
per cent test need be met only in 9 of the last 10 years; and under the Senate
provision, enacted into law, meeting the 90 per cent test in 8 of the last 10
years was deemed sufficient 5 90
The 1954 Code also introduced a new "carryover" provision for corporate
charitable contributions.19a This "carryover" provision originated in the Senate, and then was modified by the House to limit the carryover period to the
two succeeding taxable years.' 92 The Revenue Act of 1964 increased the corporate carryover period from two to five years, and, in addition, provided a
new five-year carryover period for individuals.1 93 The 1964 House Report
explained that the increased carryover period for corporations was intended
to aid corporations which have varying yearly income, but which nevertheless
commit themselves to stable yearly contributions to local charities. 9 4 The new
carryover provision for individuals was added by the Senate Committee,
which saw "no reason" to permit corporations a carryover "while individuals
are in effect compelled to waste their contributions in excess of the specified
limitation." A "more important" reason for the provision, in the Senate
Committee's view, was to eliminate the need for a donor of a large gift to
"carefully divide" it into annual parts. a5
"prohibited transaction" provision. Former § 503(e) disallowed charitable deductions for contributions to organizations that-lost their exemption by having engaged in "prohibited transactions."
There was, however, no similar linkage between the charitable deduction and § 504 (repealed by
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487), so that the charitable deduction
was not disallowed, if the recipient organization lost its exemption solely by reason of "unreasonable accumulations."
187. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954) and, with minor variation, S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954).
188. 1954 CODE § 170(b)(l)(C).
189. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954).
190. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954).
191. 1954 CODE § 170(b)(2), last sentence.
192. H.R. REP. No. 2543 (Confcrence Rcp.), 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954).
193. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272. §§ 209(c)(1) (adding 1954 CODE § 170(b)(5) for
individuals), 209(a)(1) (amending 1954 COnE § 170(b)(2) for corporations), 78 Stat. 19.
194. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1963).
195. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1964). Such division of the gift, noted the
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F.

1954-1964

Various additions were made to section 170 of the 1954 Code in the ten
years following the Code's enactment. In 1958 a subsection, "Reduction for
certain interest," was added, 9 ' reducing the charitable deduction by the
amount of interest paid by the donor on a liability to which the donated
property is subject. In 1960 a provision allowing a deduction for amounts
paid by a taxpayer to support a full-time student in his household under a
written agreement between the taxpayer and a charitable organization was
enacted.' 9 7 And in 1962, Congress enacted a provision reducing the deduction for a charitable contribution of depreciable property by the amount that
would be subject to recapture on sale as ordinary income under section
1245;19 s in 1964199 and 1966,20" this provision was extended to disallow
amounts subject to recapture under section 1250 (depreciable real property)
and under section 617 (mining exploration expenditure deductions). The Revenue Act of 1964 enacted a provision denying a charitable deduction for a
gift of a future interest in tangible personal property until all interests in and
rights to actual possession or enjoyment of the property, on the part of the
donor or related parties, have expired.'' This provision was aimed particularly at taxpayers who donated future interests in art objects to museums, and
took an immediate charitable deduction, although no change in the actual use
20 2
of the art object had yet occurred.
The ten years following the enactment of the 1954 Code also witnessed a
gradual expansion by Congress of the categories of organizations (listed in
section 170(b)(1)(A)) eligible to receive the extra ten per cent of an individual's charitable contributions. In 1956203 "medical research organizations directly engaged in continuous active conduct of medical research in
conjunction with a hospital" were added to this favored class of charities (alReport, is troublesome not only for the donor, but also for the donee-charity, which might receive unusable and unsalable undivided interests in a property, in each of a series of years, before
finally achieving full ownership.
196. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 12(a), 72 Stat. 1606, added
§ 170(b)(4) to the 1954 CODE. This provision was redesignated § 170(f)(5) by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
197. Former § 170(d), redesignated (h) by the 1969 Act. Act of September 14, 1960, Pub. L.
No. 86-779, § 7(a)(2), 74 Stat. 998.
198. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(d), 76 Stat. 960.
199. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231(b), 78 Stat. 19.
200. Act of September 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-570, § [l](b)(l), 80 Stat. 759.
Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 209(e), 78 Stat. 19, enacting a new 1954 CODE § 170(f).
201.
202. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 64-65 (1964). The House bill provided an exception (from the general rule denying an
immediate deduction) in cases where the only reservation in the gift was the retention of a life
interest by the donor; the Senate Finance Committee, however, deleted this exception, explaining
that the exception would gobble up the rule.
203. Pub. L. No. 1022, § [1], Act of August 7, 1956, ch. 1031, 70 Stat. 1117, amending 1954
CODE § 170(b)(1)(A)(iii).
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ready including hospitals). The new provision required the recipient organization to commit itself to use the gift within a statutorily specified period, to
"insure," as the House Report explained, that the gift is "actually devoted to
medical research."20 4 In 1962, a provision (originating in the Senate Finance
Committee) added state university endowment funds to the preferred
charities of section 170(b)(1)(A). These endowment funds were created as vehicles for indirect contributions to state universities in states where direct contributions are subject to legal restrictions. Whereas endowment funds for private colleges could qualify for the extra ten per cent deduction, as being a
part of the "educational organization" itself, the endowment funds for state
universities are corporations separate from their schools and cannot qualify
under the heading of "educational organization. 2 0 5 Therefore, the Senate
committee explained, the new category of state university endowment funds
was added to section 170(b)(1)(A), so that these state funds would be "placed
on the same footing with private institutions.

G.

2 0° 6

Publicly Supported Organizations

The Revenue Act of 1964 added to the list of organizations eligible to
receive the extra ten per cent of an individual's charitable contributions two
new categories of 1) government units, and 2) so-called "publicly supported"
organizations, 2

7

20 8
defined by Congress as follows:

[A]n organization referred to in subsection (c)(2) which normally receives a
substantial part of its support (exclusive of income received in the exercise or
performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501(a)),
from a government unit referred to in subsection (c)(l) or from direct or
indirect contributions from the general public.
The late President Kennedy's 1963 Tax Message to Congress explained that
his proposed extension of the extra ten per cent deduction to charitable

organizations

09

which are publicly supported and controlled ... will prove advantageous to
the advancement of highly desirable activities in our communities, such as
symphony orchestras and the work of community chests and cultural centers.

This provision, the House Report further explained, was intended to produce
"greater uniformity in the availability" of the extra ten per cent deduction,

204.
205.

H.R. REP. No. 2887, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956).
S. REP. No. 2109, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1962).

206. Id.
207. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 209(a), 78 Stat. 19, adding § 170(b)(1)(A)(v),(vi) to the 1954 CODE.

208. Id.
209. Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963).
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rectifying, in particular, the ineligibility of "many cultural and educational organizations and major charitable organizations.1 2 10 The "public support" requirement was intended to preclude the eligibility of private foundations
which, the committee believed, "frequently do not make contributions to the
operating philanthropic organizations for extended periods of time and in the
meanwhile use the funds for investments"; this extension of the extra ten per
cent deduction thus was "intended to encourage immediately spendable receipts of contributions for charitable organizations.1 2 11 The 1964 Act imposed
another disadvantage on private foundations; section 170 was amended to
disallow the unlimited charitable deduction with respect to contributions to a
private foundation. 2 12 A supposed tendency of private foundations to be slow
in funnelling contributions to active charitable uses was cited once again by
13
the Senate Finance Committee in explanation.
H.

1966 Treasury Regulations

The statutory definition of a "publicly-supported" organization clearly required additional implementation by the Treasury; and on December 21,
1964 the IRS issued TIR-667 (the basis for Revenue Ruling 66-100)14 to provide temporary rules pending the issuance of Regulations. Under TIR-667,
an organization met a "mechanical test" for qualification as a publiclysupported organization if 33 1/3 per cent of its "total support" for three out
of the last four taxable years came from a government unit or from contributions made directly or indirectly by the general public. The IRS defined
"support" to include not only contributions but also "investment income" and
also net income from related or unrelated business activities (unless excluded
by the statute as income realized from the performance of the organization's
tax-exempt purpose). The IRS also provided that contributions by any individual, trust, or corporation could not be included in "public support" for a
taxable year to the extent they exceeded one per cent of the organization's
"total support" for that year. Revenue Ruling 66-100 stated in conclusion that,
apart from the mechanical test, an organization might be shown to be
210. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1963).
211. Id.
212. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 87-272, § 209(b), 78 Stat. 19, inserting new subsection
170(g). The provision as enacted allowed the unlimited deduction for contributions to any organization eligible to receive the extra 10 per cent deduction, and also to any charitable organization devoting substantially more than half of its assets and income directly to the active conduct
of charitable activities.
213. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1964). In apparent conformity with this
rationale, Congress also allowed the unlimited deduction in the case of a contribution to an organization which within three years funnelled at least 50 per cent of the amount of the contribution and all of its net income for the period to active charitable activities or to other organizations
qualified with respect to the unlimited deduction.
214. 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 51.
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publicly-supported "on the basis of all the facts and circumstances."2' 15 However, absent any further guidelines, the IRS refused to issue rulings on such
a basis.
It was the apparent intention of Congress that this new provision of the
1964 Act extend the benefit of the extra ten per cent deduction to museums,
libraries, and similar organizations. Such organizations were repeatedly mentioned as intended beneficiaries of the new provision throughout consideration of the bill in Congress. Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, in his statement
accompanying President Kennedy's 1963 Tax Message, included "community
chests, museums, symphony orchestras, etc.," among organizations to be
covered by the proposed legislation; 1 6 the technical implementation accompanying the Tax Message listed "museums, libraries, civic centers, symphony orchestras, and similar organizations" as beneficiaries of the proposals. 2 17 Furthermore, the technical explanation in the House Report
21 8
stated that the new provision would apply to:
[N]ational charitable organizations which normally receive a substantial part
of their financial support from a wide segment of the general public, and also
to contributions to museums, libraries, civic centers, symphony, orchestras, and
similar organizations which normally derive a substantial part of their financial support from a representative number of persons in the communities
where their activities are centered.

Encouraged by such statements surrounding the provision's enactment,
some museums and similar organizations were disappointed to find that they
had difficulty in qualifying under the mechanical test. Heavy endowments
and large contributions by single individuals were serious obtacles to qualification, in view of the Treasury's inclusion of investment income in total support
and its one per cent limitation on gifts by a single individual or organization,
in measuring "public support." Subsequent efforts by museums and similar
organizations to convince the Treasury to liberalize its definition of "publiclysupported" organizations bore good fruit in the Treasury's formulation of
proposed Regulations issued in 1965,2'9 and of final Regulations, issued in
1966.220

In the proposed Regulations, TIR-667's mechanical test was liberalized
only to a small extent. In a relatively neutral change, the proposed Regulations made a four year aggregrate period the basis for applying the "33 1/3%
of total support" test (formerly applied on a "3 out of 4 year" basis) and for

215.
100,
51,
216. Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, supra note 209, at 46.
217. Id. at 100.
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., lstSess. A48 (1963).

219. 30 Fed. Reg. 14158 (1965).
220. T.D. 6900, 1966-2 CuM. BULL.
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applying the "excess over 1%" test. 2 The proposed Regulations provided
some relief to museums and similar organizations by excluding capital gains
'
Also, the proposed Regand related business income from "total support."2 22
223
support.
government
of
ulations clarified the definition
The articulation of the "facts and circumstances" test in the proposed
Regulations did, however, greatly improve chances of qualifying as "publiclysupported" organizations. The proposed Regulations stated that in applying
this test "no single factor" would be "conclusive. ' 224 The Regulations did,
however, list four factors that would "indicate" that an organization was

public-supported

:225

1) "The organization is constituted so as to receive contributions, directly or
indirectly, from a wide segment of the public." This factor can be met by
showing either (a) receipt of contributions from a number of persons in its
community; or (b) an organizational structure and method of operation under
which it makes bona fide solicitations for broad based support, or, in the case
of a new organization, under which it is required to make such solications; or
(c) receipt of support from community chests; or (d) its possession of a substantial number of dues-paying members.
2) "The organization has a governing body ... comprised of public officials,
of individuals chosen by public officials . . . , etc., as distinguished from individuals selected by a limited number of donors" or related parties. An example relating to an art museum indicated that the "etc." would include "representative citizens" of the community.
3) The organization "is required to" and does make regularly available to the
public its financial reports.
4) The organization, if of a "type which generally holds open to the public its
buildings . .. or performances . . . actually follows such practice."
After the publication of the proposed Regulations, museums and similar
organizations urged further clarification and modification of these rules. The
final Regulations issued in 1966 retained the mechanical test without change;
the efforts of the museums and others, however, were rewarded by liberalization and clarification of the facts and circumstances test. The final Regulations made explicit provision for flexibility in the application of the facts and
circumstances test, offering aid in particular to newly-created and to
specialized organizations. In determining the weight and relevancy of the var2
ious "facts," the nature and age of the organization were to be considered; 2,
and in determining what constitutes "a representative number of persons,"
for purposes of measuring "public support," the "type of organization" and
whether it was devoted to a "specialized field" of limited appeal were to be

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(b), 30 Fed. Reg. 14160 (1965).
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(5)(ii)(b)(1),(2), 30 Fed. Reg. 14160 (1965).
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(5)(ii)(c), 30 Fed. Reg. 14160 (1965).
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(2), 30 Fed. Reg. 14160 (1965).
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(2)(i)-(iv), 30 Fed. Reg. 14160-61 (1965).
Final Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(2) (1966).
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considered.2 27 The final Regulations also made it clear that the organization's
governing body could consist not only of public officials and their designates,
but also of "citizens broadly representative of the interests and views of the
public. ' 22 8 Under the final Regulations, the actual, annual "bona fide dissemination" of financial information to the public was sufficient, except in the case
of a new organization which only must be "constituted so as to require such
reporting. 2 2 9 The final Regulations made two other important changes in the
facts and circumstances test. While listing the same four factors as the proposed Regulations, they stated that "the most important consideration" is the
first of the factors, "the organization's source of support. 2 3 0 The final Regulations also provided that "under no circumstances" could an "organization
which normally receives substantially all of its contributions . . . from the

members of a single family or from a few individuals" be deemed
"publicly-supported. 2 ' The efforts of the museums in particular bore fruit
in clarifying and liberalizing changes in example (3) of the Regulations, deal232
ing specifically with an art museum.
The definition of a "publicly-supported organization" in section 170(b)(1)(A) of the statute and in the Regulations thereunder must be viewed
in the light of the definition's prior use in other parts of the Code. The
category of "publicly-supported" organizations made its first appearance in
the tax law when the Revenue Act of 1943 established an information return
requirement for tax-exempt charitable organizations but excepted from this
new requirement religious organizations, certain educational organizations,
and "publicly-supported" organizations.2 3 3 The Revenue Act of 1950 exempted these same three categories of charities (and two other categories) from its
234
new "prohibited transactions" and "unreasonable accumulation" provisions.
This exception for "publicly-supported" organizations, appearing in section
3813(a)(3) of the 1939 Code and later in 1954 Code section 503(b)(3) (repealed by the Tax Reform act of 1969), is phrased in language identical, in all
relevant respects, to the language in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). (Such borrowing
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Final
Final
Final
Final
Final

Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.

Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.

§
§
§
§
§

1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(3) (1966).
1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(4)(i) (1966).
1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(4)(ii) (1966).
1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(3) (1966).
1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(2) (1966).

232.
233.

Final Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(c)(5) Example (3).
Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, 1939 CODE § 117, 58 Stat. 21, adding § 54(f) to the 1939
CODE. Section 54(f) became § 6033 of the 1954 CODE. Sections 6033(a)(3) and 54(f)(3) excepted
charitable organizations "supported, in whole or in part, by funds contributed by the United
States or any State or political subdivision thereof, or . . . primarily supported by contributions of
the general public." The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(d)(1), transported
this phrase to § 6033(a)(2)(c)(iii), and limited this exception to organizations with $5,000 or less in
annual gross receipts.
234. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 331, 64 Stat. 906, adding §§ 3813, 3814 to the 1939
CODE.
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from prior legislative definitions appears to be a favorite legislative drafting
technique of the writers of our tax laws. Its soundness, however, can be questioned, since it is based on an assumption called "Foof" (Faith of our Fathers),
i.e., on the assumption that whoever drafted the prior legislation knew what
he was doing and that a definition which may have been all right in one
context is appropriate for that different purpose. For example, it may legitimately be questioned whether source of funds (i.e., from public contributions)
rather than control of their use is an appropriate way of distinguishing
whether a museum or library should be treated as a public organization
rather than as a private foundation.)
Thus the Treasury, in formulating Regulations under section 170, had to
consider the danger that an excessively liberal definition of "publiclysupported" organizations might allow private foundations to qualify, not only
under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), but also under sections 503(b)(3) and
6033(a)(3). This consideration may have led the Treasury to formulate a
rather strict mechanical test. On the other hand, desiring to implement the
congressional intent in the 1964 Revenue Act of encouraging contributions to
truly publicly-supported organizations, the Treasury also provided a more
flexible and liberal "facts and circumstances" test, as a basis for the IRS to
examine the credentials of each organization.
With the passage of the 1969 Tax Reform Act the definition of a
"publicly-supported organization" took on greater significance. First, the percentage limit on an individual's charitable deduction was raised, so that gifts
to the favored section 170(b)(1)(A) organizations could total 50 per cent of the
taxpayer's contribution base. And second, Congress imposed a series of new
restrictions on one class of section 501(c)(3) organizations, i.e., the private
foundation; and, in defining a private foundation in section 509(a)(1), Congress excluded the class of organizations described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(i)(vi). (This was the class eligible for the extra 10 per cent deduction before the
1969 Act, and eligible for the 50 per cent deduction under the 1969 Act.)
The repeated references in the legislative history to this class of organizations (i.e., those described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(vi)) as being essentially
the same as in prior law, 23 5 and Congress's exclusion of this class from the
new "private foundation" category would seem to have amounted to tacit
congressional approval of the 1966 Treasury Regulations clarifying the boundaries of this class. Thus, the Treasury's formulation of a flexible "facts and
circumstances" test in these Regulations (offering to organizations failing
under the "mechanical" test an alternative method of qualification as a
publicly-supported organization under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi)) would seem to

235.

See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong.,

1st Sess. 57 (1969).
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have been endorsed by Congress. Despite this rather clear indication that
Congress approved the final 1966 Regulations, the Treasury adamantly insisted on making significant restrictive changes in the definition of a
"publicly-supported" organization in a new Regulation section 1.170A-9(e),
filed with the Office of the Federal Register on December 29, 1972.236
I.

1972 Treasury Regulation

The new Regulation placed a significant obstacle to qualification as "publicy-supported" in the way of museums and similar organizations, by adding a
new mechancial element to the "facts and circumstances" test. Under the new
Regulation an organization failing the "33 1/3 percent-of-support" test, must,
in any event, pass a "10 percent-of-support" floor test in order to be eligible
to be considered under the "facts and circumstances" test. 237 Under the 1972
Regulation, two threshold requirements, (1) the "10 percent-of-support"
limitation 238 and (2) a requirement that the organization be "so organized and
operated as to attract new and additional public or governmental support on
a continuous basis ,' 239 must be met, before a flexible weighing of "all pertinent facts and circumstances" can be undertaken. The 1972 Regulation did,
however, give some recognition to the plight of heavily-endowed organizations in describing one of the pertinent factors, the "percentage of support
received . . . from public or governmental sources."240 The Regulation stated

that where an organization received a "high percentage of its total support
from investment income on its endowment funds," it will nevertheless satisfy
this factor, if the "endowment funds were originally contributed by a governmental unit or by the general public." (This concession, however, will afford little solace to a heavily-endowed organization, which fails the initial
"10% of support" test; see Example (2).)241 The new Regulations, moreover,
did offer some relief for organizations receiving large gifts from a single
source. In measuring "public support," for purposes of the "33 1/3%" or the
new "10%"rule, the 1972 Regulation included contributions by a single individual or corporation up to two per cent (rather than one per cent) of the
organization's total support.24 2 The 1972 Regulation also allowed an organization to exclude certain "unusual grants" given by "disinterested parties" from

236.

T.D. 7242. 1973-1 CUM. BuLL. 118.

237. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3) (1973).
238. Treas Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(i) (1973).
239. Treas Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(ii) (1973). The theory seems to be that, if an organization is
dependent upon continued public support, it will be more apt to be responsive to the wishes of
the public than if it already is adequately endowed.
240. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(iii) (1973).
241. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(9) Example (2) (1973).
242. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(i) (1973).
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both "total support" and "public support" in applying the "33 1/3%" and
"10%" tests.

243

Nevertheless, these new Regulations threaten serious consequences for a
heavily endowed museum or similar organization. If the organization fails the
initial "10% of support" test, and thus does not qualify as a section
170(b)(1)(A)(vi) organization, it probably will fall into the "private foundation"
category and thus be subjected to the four per cent excise tax on its investment
income, even though it (1ualifies as an "operating foundation" under section
4942(j)(3). If a museum, due to a heavy endowment, fails to qualify for the
exception to private foundation status in section 509(a)(1) (the exception for
section 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(vi) organizations), it most likely also will fail to qualify
for the exception in section 509(a)(2), which is available only to organizations
whose "gross investment income" does not exceed one-third of support.
Clearly, remedial legislation is needed to remove this discrimination against
museums and similar cultural organizations which serve the public as faith244
fully as do the colleges and hospitals.
III
HISTORY OF UNRELATED BUSINESS TAX

A.

Early History

The tax on unrelated business income of charitable organizations was first
enacted in the Revenue Act of 1950. However, much earlier the business activities of charitable organizations engaged the attention of Congress, the
courts and the Service.
As already noted, the inclusion of an exemption provision for charitable
organizations in the Corporate Excise Act of 1909 was deemed to be superfluous by some senators, in that the tax was by its terms only applicable to a
"corporation . . . organized for profit."2415

Senator Bacon, who considered a

specific exemption provision to be essential, cited the example of the
Methodist Book Concern, "a very large printing establishment," which, he
said, "is organized for profit, but it is not organized for individual profit. It is
organized to make a profit to extend religious work and to extend benevolent
246
work, charitable work, and educational work."
243. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(ii) (1973).
244. See testimony of Kyran M. McGrath, Director of American Association of Museums, and
testimony of Rollin van N. Hadley, Director of Isabella Steward Gardner Museum, for the Association of Art Museum Directors, Hearings on The Role of PrivateFoundations Before the Subcomm.
on Foundations of the Senate Finance Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 99 (1974).
245. 44 CONG. REC. 4148-51 (1909) (emphasis added); W. SMITH & C. CHIECHI, supra note 10,
at 11. For a detailed analysis of the congressional debate, see Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce:
Section 501(c)(3)--How Much UnrelatedBusiness Activity?, 21 TAX. L. REv. 53, 55-58 (1965).
246. 44 CONG. REC. 4151 (1909); quoted in Eliasberg, supra note 245, at 56 & n. 16.
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One particular type of profit-making, the earning of a profit by "holding
title to property," was formally recognized as compatible with exemption in
the Revenue Act of 1916, which specifically exempted from tax those organizations organized for the exclusive purpose of earning such a profit and turning it over to an exempt organization. 47
A strict stand against an exempt organization's engaging in business actitivies was taken by the Service in its Regulations 248 accompanying the
Revenue Act of 1918 and in O.D. 953,249 both published in 1921. The Regulations stated that a religious corporation owning and working a large amount
of farm land and manufacturing and selling clothing for profit would not
qualify for exemption, even though its property was held in common and no
individual profit was made by its members. 250 In O.D. 953, the Service declared that an organization "which owns property in excess of its needs and
carries on industrial pursuits distinct from its exempt activities is not exempt
from taxation.

25 1

The validity of the Service's non-permissive attitude toward commercial
activities of exempt organizations was soon subjected to the scrutiny of the
2 2
United States Supreme Court in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden De Predicadores. 1
There the Court upheld the tax exemption of a religious corporation with far
eastern missions which derived most of its income in the form of rents,
dividends, and interest from its large properties in the Philippines and the
rest, a "relatively small" amount, from alms for mass, occasional sales of its
stock, and sales of wine, chocolate, etc. supplied for use in its churches, missions, and parsonages. As to the investment income, the Court deemed it to
be "common knowledge" that the charitable activities of exempt corporations
"are largely carried on with income received from properties dedicated to
their pursuit. ' 25 3 The Court noted that this investment income was devoted
exclusively to exempt purposes (in fact, the members of this ancient religious
order had taken vows of poverty). It concluded that in earning such income,
the organization was "adhering to and advancing those purposes, and not
stepping aside from them or engaging in a business pursuit. '254 As to the
wine and chocolates, the Court noted that there was no "selling to the public
or in competition with others," but that, rather, the articles were supplied for
247. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1 l(a) Twelve, 39 Stat. 767. This provision now appears
in 1954 CODE § 501(c)(2). See Eliasberg, supra note 245, at 58-59.
248. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517 (1919).
249. 4 CuM. BULL. 261 (1921).
250. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517 (1919), quoted in Eliasberg, supra note 245, at 60.
251. 4 CUM. BULL. 261 (1921), quoted in Eliasberg, supra note 245, at 60. Eliasberg points out,
at 60 n.31, that the Service had taken a more indulgent view of an exempt organization's commercial activities only a year earlier in 2 CUM. BULL. 209 (1920).
252. 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
253. 263 U.S. at 581.
254. 263 U.S. at 582.
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use within the organization, some "for strictly religious use and the others for
uses which are purely incidental" to the organization's work.2 55 In the course
of its opinion, the Court also offered a much broader rationale for its decision, making two broad observations about the exemption clause itself:2 56
First, it recognizes that a corporation may be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, and yet
have a net income. Next, it says nothing about the source of the income, but
makes the destination the ultimate test of exemption.
This ultimate "destination of income" theory, i.e., that the carrying on of
business activities would not disqualify a charitable organization from exempt
status if the profits so earned were devoted solely to its charitable purposes,
was cited by the Board of Tax Appeals, as the basis for two decisions in which
it upheld an organization's tax exemption: Unity School of Christianityz 57 (operation of inn and farm and publication of books and periodicals), and Sand
Springs Home2 5 8 (carrying on of several business activities, in course of which
the organization "trade(d] with the general public and compete[d] with other
corporations and individuals engaged in similar businesses").2 5 9 In Roche's
Beach v. Commissioner,2 6 0 the court of appeals endorsed the "destination of income" test, citing Trinidad, Sand Springs, and Unity School, in deciding that a
corporation operating a bathing beach and rental business for the benefit of a
charitable foundation was still entitled to exemption.
In 1942, the Treasury Department made its first proposal for levying a tax
on the unrelated business income of tax-exempt organizations .2 6 In testimony
before the House Ways and Means Committee, Treasury representatives said
that many exempt organizations had "so far departed from the purpose of
the exemption as to engage in trades and business completely unrelated to
their exempt activities. 2' 6 2 The House Report accompanying the Revenue Act
of 1943263 acknowledged that "many" tax-exempt organizations were "directly
competing with" tax-paying businesses and that this increasingly "widespread"
practice was "affording a loophole for tax evasion and avoidance." The committee, however, lacking "sufficient data to act intelligently," decided to "con255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
263 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added).
CCH DEC. 1435, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926), acquiescing.
CCH DEC. 2180, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927).

259. Weithorn & Liles, Unrelated Business Income Tax: Changes Affecting Journal Advertising
Revenues, 45 TAXES 791, 792 (1967).

260.
261.

96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259, at 792-93.

262.

Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d

Sess. 89 (1942), quoted in Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259, at 793. As noted by Weithorn and
Liles, the legislative proposal was essentially the same as the 1950 enactment; however, the phrase
"necessarily incident to" was used instead of "substantially related," and the amount of the exclusion was 5,000 dollars rather than 1,000 dollars as enacted in 1950.
263. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, 58 Stat. 21.
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tinue the present tax exemption," but at the same time impose an information
return requirement on exempt organizations 264 (with certain select categories
exempted from the requirement). 6 " The House Committee promised to
"make a thorough study" of the data so obtained "with a view to closing this
existing loophole and requiring payment of tax, and the protection of legiti266

mate companies against this unfair competitive situation.1

B.

Revenue Act of 1950

In 1950, the Treasury renewed its proposal for taxing the unrelated business income of charitable and educational organizations. 26 7 In his statement
before the House Ways and Means Committee, Secretary of the Treasury
Snyder noted that "[s]ome colleges and other institutions are engaging in a
wide variety of business undertakings, including the production of such items
as automobile parts, chinaware, and food proCLcts, and the operation of
theaters, oil wells, and cotton gins."2 ' The Treasury had unsuccessfully argued in Trinidad and subsequent cases that the carrying on of substantial unrelated business activities should disqualify a charitable organization from exemption. Now it made the more practical suggestion that "if such [unrelated
business] activities are conducted by the exempt organization itself, the exemption of the organization would not be disturbed, but such business income
would be segregated and subjected to tax.

'2 6 9

However, in a case such as

Roche's Beach, where a business organization itself conducted no exempt activities but instead fed its business profits to a separate charitable organization, the Treasury recommended that "the entire income" of the "feeder"
2 70

be taxed.

These unrelated commercial activities of charitable and educational organizations referred to by Secretary Synder were seen as embodying a double
threat:
1. A narrowing of the revenue base, and
2. an unfair competitive edge for exempt organizations over taxpayers
carrying on the same commercial activities.

264.

H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24(1943).

265. The House bill exempting religious organizations, educational organizations maintaining
a regular faculty, curriculum and student body, and publicly-supported charitable organizations
was amended by the Senate to include publicly-supported societies for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals and certain other non- charitable" exempt organizations. See S. REP. No.
627. 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1943) and Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 117(f), 58 Stat. 21.
266. H.R. REP. No. 871..mupia note 264. a 24-25.
267. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1950 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 165 (1950).
268. Id. at 19.
269. Id. at 165.
270. Id. at 165.
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These two threats were interrelated in that exempt organization competition
would tend to drive taxpayers out of business, thus narrowing the tax base.
In his 1950 tax message to Congress, President Truman included exempt
organization "unrelated business activities" in the category of "loopholes"
which should be closed both as a matter of tax equity and also to offset the
27 1
loss of revenues anticipated from his proposed reduction of excise taxes.
However, it was the "unfair competitive advantage" over taxpaying businesses,
which was most often cited as the reason for the new tax. In his 1950 tax
message, President Truman noted that the exemption privilege had been
"misused" by some educational organizations "to gain competitive advantage
over private enterprise. ' 27 2 The House Report explicitly cited such competi27 3
tion as its chief concern:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed here
is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-flee status of these Section
101 [now Section 501(c)] organizations enables them to use their profits tax-

free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the
profits remaining after taxes.
The most notorious example cited of such "unrelated business activities"
was the acquisition of the Mueller Spaghetti Company with borrowed funds
by a tax-exempt corporation established to feed the profits of the business,
2 74
after acquisition debt payments, to the New York Univesity Law School.
The tax-exempt status of this particular feeder corporation was being considered by the courts, at the time Congress was considering Treasury's
proposals. 27 5 Other well-publicized examples of such "unrelated business activities" included the purchase and leaseback of most of the land and buildings of Allied Stores Corporation, a department store chain, by Union College
of Schenectady, 276 and the running of Willow Run Airport by the University

271. Id. at 3-4. See also Statement of Leonard .J. Calhoun. Counsel, National Tax Equality
Association, in Hearings on Revenue Reviion Be/ore the Honse Conom. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong.,

1st Sess. 3412 (1947), where Mr. Calhoun states that the purchase of businesses by exempt educational institutions has "reduced the tax base."
272. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1950, supra note 267, at 4.
273. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950).

274. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), revg 14 T.C. 922 (1950);
Statement of Leonard J. Calhoun, supra note 271, at 3410-11. Mr Calhoun described this and
other acquisitions of manufacturing concerns and real estate by educational institutions; see also
testimony of John Gerdes on behalf of New York University describing the Mueller acquisition,
three similar acquisitions, and other prospective acquisitions for New York University's benefit.
Id. at 3535.
275. 190 F.2d at 120. The Tax Court denied tax-exempt status to the feeder corporation,
distinguishing Trinidad where the corporation seeking exemption itself engaged in charitable activities, and declining to follow Roche's Beach. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, acting
after the passage of the 1950 Revenue Act, upheld the feeder's exempt status for 1947 under the
law then in force, relying on Roche's Beach.
276. Statement of Leonard J. Calhoun, supra note 271, at 3411. Myers, Taxing the Colleges, 38
CORNELL L.Q. 368, 374-75 (1953).
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of Michigan.1 77
In the Revenue Act of 1950,278 Congress enacted provisions intended to
counteract the corollary dangers of unfair competition and resulting revenue
loss seen as stemming from the business activities of tax-exempt organizations.
A two-fold attack was launched against the perceived abuses. First, tax exemption was denied to the "feeder" organization; the statute provided that an
"organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or
business for profit" could not claim tax-exempt status "on the ground that all
of its profits are payable" to an exempt organization. 279 This provision met
the immediate problem presented by the Mueller case. However, it was apparent to Congress that imposition of the tax on the "feeder" alone would merely
result in the transfer of business activities from the feeder to its exempt
parent.280 Therefore, Congress added a second prong to the attack, a tax on
the unrelated business income of "charitable, etc." organizations (except for
churches or conventions or association of churches).28 1 The intended limited
scope of this direct attack on a charitable organization's business activities is
made clear in the House Report, 2 2 and even more emphatically in the Senate
28 3
Report:
In neither the House bill nor your committee's bill does this provision deny
the exemption where the organizations are carrying on unrelated active business enterprises, nor require that they dispose of such businesses. Both provisions merely impose the same tax on income derived from an unrelated trade
or business as is borne by their competitors. In fact it is not intended that the
tax imposed on unrelated business income will have any effect on the taxexempt status of any organization.
Furthermore, Congress placed two important restrictions on the business
income subject to the tax: first, the income must be from a business "regularly
carried on by" the organization;2 8 4 and second, the income must be from an
"unrelated trade or business," i.e., a business "not substantially related" to the
performance of the organization's exempt purposes "aside from the need of
such organization for income. "285 In addition, a $1,000 specific exemption
Id. at 376. This raised the constitutional question of unrelated business activity by state
institutions.
Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906.
Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(b), 64 Stat. 906, amending 1939 CODE § 101 (now
1954 CODE § 502).
280. H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 66, at 37; S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at 29.
281. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906, adding 1939 CODE §§ 421-24 (now
1954 CODE §§ 511-15).
282. H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 66, at 37.
283. S.REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at29.
284. 1939 CODE § 422(a) (now 1954 CODE § 512(a)(1)); H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 66, at
37; S.REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at 37, 106.
277.
related
278.
279.

285.
S.

REP.

1939 CODE § 422(b) (now 1954 CODE § 513(a)); H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 66, at 37;
No. 2375, supra note 67, at 29, 107. The Technical Explanation in the Senate Report, id.at
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was provided, which was intended to dispose of small cases where the unrelated business income was "incidental."2'8 6 Also excluded from the term "unrelated business income" were dividends, interest, royalties, rents (except certain debt-financed "leaseback income") and capital gains and losses. The
Senate Report's explanation for this exclusion was that such "passive" investment income was "not likely to result in serious competition for taxable
businesses having similar income" and that such income has "long been recognized as a proper source of revenue for educational and charitable
organizations.

2 7

C.

Leaseback Transactions

A related abuse which Congress sought to correct in the Revenue Act of
1950 was a "bootstrap" transaction in which the exempt organization purchased rental real estate with borrowed funds and then leased the property, often back to the vendor, using the tax-free rental income to pay
off the debt. 28 8 What Congress found particularly objectionable in such transactions was the fact that the exempt organization need not commit any of its
own funds toward the purchase of the property. Thus, instead of seeking an
"adequate rate of return" on investment of "its own funds," the exempt organization was "obviously trading on its exemption. ' 28 9 Moreover, since such
purchases of property were "not in any way limited" by the amount of the
exempt organization's own funds, it was feared that such organizations might
"in the not too distant future . . . own the great bulk of the commercial and
industrial real estate in the country. '290 Finally, Congress felt that an exempt
organization engaging in such a transaction probably had "in effect sold part
of its exemption," in that it might have offered the vendor better terms
(either a higher purchase price or lower "leaseback" rental) than a tax-paying
vendor could afford to offer; and this abuse, Congress felt, was particularly
"likely to occur" when the exempt vendor need not invest any of its own
resources in the purchase. 2 9 1 In response to this problem, the new legislation
provided that if an exempt organization leased out under a lease of over five
years real property 292 acquired or improved with borrowed funds, a certain

107, notes that "[I]f a trade or business is regularly carried on, it is still not subject to the ...
unless such business is unrelated within the meaning of section 422(b)."
286. 1939 CODE § 421(c) (now 1954 CODE § 512(b)(12)).

tax

287. 1939 CODE § 422(a)(1)-(5); S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at 30-31.
288. S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at 31; Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1950, supra note
267, at 19.
289. S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at 31.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 31-32.
292. Real property was defined for these purposes to include "personal property of the lessor
leased by it to the lessee of its real estate if the lease of such personal property is made under, or
in connection with, the lease of such real estate." 1939 CODE § 423(c).
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percentage of the resulting rental income would be included in its gross unrelated business income; this percentage was the fraction consisting of the outstanding indebtedness as numerator and the "adjusted basis" of the property
2 93

as denominator.

When the Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted by Congress, for the most
part only changes of arrangement and minor changes in phraseology, but not
changes of substance, were made in the "unrelated business tax" and feeder
provisions.294 However, one obvious loophole in the "leaseback" provision was
closed. The 1950 provisions had applied only to leases for a term of more
than five years (and the lease term was to include periods for which a renewal
option could be exercised). Congress in 1954, noting that the tax was being
avoided by "continuous renewals of leases for less than 5 years,' 295 extended
the provisions so that the tax applied in the sixth and succeeding years of a
business tenant's occupancy of the property, even though the lease was only
2
for a term of five years or less.

96

Even after the tightening of the "business lease" provision (then section
514) in 1954, there remained an important exclusion from its coverage-the
short term lease of five years or less.2 97 Thus "bootstrap" transactions, now
tailored to fit within this statutory exception, continued to flourish, and the
Service, in an attempt to render such transactions less profitable, launched
challenges against the favorable tax treatment claimed by each participant (the
298
In Commissioner v. Brown, 299
seller, the lessee, and the exempt purchaser).
the Service sought to deny capital gains treatment to the seller in a "bootstrap" transaction. In that case, the exempt organization-purchaser received
80 per cent of the operating profits of the acquired lumber business from
the lessee-operating company and then turned over 90 per cent of such
payments to the sellers in reduction of its acquisition debt. The Supreme
Court held that the seller was entitled to capital gains treatment, rejecting the
Service's argument that, due to the absence of risk-shifting from seller to

293. 1939 CODE § 423; S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 67, at 32.
294. The "feeder" provision now appeared in 1954 CODE § 502 and the "unrelated business
tax" provisions appeared in 1954 CODE §§ 511-15.
295. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954).
296. 1954 CODE § 514(a)(2)(B).
297. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 565-66 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 44-45 (1969); S. REP. No. 522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1969).
298. Cooper, Trends in the Taxation of Unrelated Business Activity, 29 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FED.
TAXATION, 1999, 2005-06 (1971). See also Rev. Rul. 420, 1954 CUM. BULL. 128, advising partic-

ipants in bootstrap transactions that the exempt organization might lose its exemption, that it
would be taxed on the rental income, and that the seller would be denied capital gains treatment.
For a list of cases where the IRS followed the approach of challenging the lessee's deduction of
rental payments, see University Hill Foundation v.Commissioner, 446 F.2d 701, 703 n. 1 (1971).
One of these cases, Warren Brekke, 40 T.C. 789 (1963), on remand 25 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 1063
(1966), is described in Cooper, supra at 2005.
299. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
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buyer, there was no "sale." In closing, the Court described the Service's approach as "a clear case of 'overkill' if aimed at preventing the involvement of
tax-exempt entities in the purchase and operation of business enterprises."' 30 0
The Court noted that Congress, having considered the problems of exempt
organizations' purchasing businesses and paying for property out of the future earnings of the purchased property, had "responded, if at all, with precise provisions of narrow application." Thus, the Court concluded, the framing of any further rules in this area was the province of Congress.
In University Hill Foundation v. Commissioner,3 °1 the Service sought to deny

tax exemption to a foundation which had engaged in twenty-one "bootstrap"
purchases of businesses and paid over all its profits to Loyola University, on
the ground that it was not "operated exclusively" for exempt purposes. The
Tax Court, however, upheld the foundation's claim to exemption. That court
did not find "active, direct participation" by the foundation in the leased-out
businesses; it rejected the Service's argument that the leases were, in reality,
joint ventures. And it held that the foundation could not be taxed as a section
502 "feeder" as it fell within that section's proviso specifically excluding from
its definition of trade or business the "rental by an organization of its real
property (including personal property leased with real property)." Similarly, it
held that the foundation's rental income was not subject to the unrelated business tax in view of section 512(b)(3)'s exclusion, from unrelated business taxable income, of rent. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the commissioner's
determination. It found that the foundation was a "used-business dealer" and
thus "engaged in commercial business for profit. ' 30 2 The rental proviso in the
section 502 feeder provision, it held, was not intended to preserve the tax
exemption of organizations trading on their exemption by regularly engaging
in bootstrap transactions.
This unexpected judicial support for the Service's long struggle against the
bootstrap transaction was preceded and overshadowed by its victory in Congress in 1969. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, passed while the Tax Court's
University Hill decision was still on appeal, 30 3 replaced the narrow "business
lease" provision with a new section 514, "Unrelated Debt-Financed Income,"
offering a much more comprehensive solution to the "bootstrap transaction"
problem. Under this sweeping new provision, an exempt organization receiving any income from "debt-financed" property, unrelated in use to its exempt
function, would be subjected to the unrelated business tax on the same proportion of that income as the outstanding acquisiton indebtedness bears to the
300. 380 U.S. at 579.
301. 51 T.C. 548, rev'd, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971).
302. 446 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 1971).
303. Both the Senate and House Reports discussed the Clay Brown case and the Tax Court's
decision in University Hill in explaining the need for the new provision. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45-46 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1969).
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property's adjusted basis. The term "debt-financed property" is very broadly
defined to include (with certain modifications) "any property which is held to
produce income and with respect to which there is an acquisition indebted4
ness . . . at any time during the taxable year.111
D.

Treasury Regulations

After Congress enacted the unrelated business tax, controversy arose as to
the intended scope of the tax. The Regulations contemporaneously adopted
by the Treasury in 1952 (under the 1939 Code) 30 5 and readopted later, without major substantive changes, in 1958 (under the 1954 Code) 3 n set forth
three elements required for the imposition of the unrelated business tax and
furnished definitions of these elements. First, there must be a "trade or business," and this term, stated the Regulations, "has the same meaning as it has
in section 162. "3o7 Second, the trade or business must be "regularly carried on
by the organization," i.e., "conducted with sufficient consistency to indicate a
continuing purpose of the organization to derive some of its income from
such activity." "An activity," noted the Regulations, "may be regularly carried
on even though its performance is infrequent or seasonal.13 0 8 Third, the business must not be "substantially related" to the performance of the
organization's exempt function. A business, stated the Regulations, is "substantially related," if its "principal purpose ... is to further" the organization's
30 9
exempt purposes.
The IRS, however, perceiving a "need for a more complete and detailed
explanation of the statute," carried out a "major study" of the statute's intended application 3 1t0 which culminated in the publication of new proposed
Regulations on April 14, 1967 and the filing of new final Regulations on
December 11, 1967.311 These new Regulations redefined the terms "unrelated
trade or business" and "unrelated business taxable income." One apparent
target of these changes was the approximately $100 million gross annual advertising revenues of journals published by nonprofit organizations.3 1t The
304. 1954 CODE § 514(b)(1).
305. T.D. 5928, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 181.
306. T.D. 6301, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 197. See especially former Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-i and
former Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 both added by T.D. 6301, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 197. Both Regulations were amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 274; former Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-I
(1958) was redesignated Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-2, "[d]efinition applicable to taxable years beginning before Dec. 13, 1967" and former Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (1958) was redesignated Treas.
Reg. § 1.513-2, "[d]efinition of unrelated trade or business applicable to taxable years beginning
before Dec. 13, 1967."
307. Present Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(1).
308. Present Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(2),(3).
309. Present Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(2),(4).
310. T.I.R. No. 899 (April 14, 1967), 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6557 announcing
completion of the study and publication of proposed Regulations.
311.

T.D. 6939, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 274.

312.

Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259, at 791. The journals apparently affected included
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not insignificant competition, in the area of advertising revenues, that the
exempt journals could offer to non-exempt journals seemed to weigh heavily
in the Treasury's decision to attempt to declare these revenues subject to tax.
In T.I.R. 899, announcing the completion of its study, the Treasury declared that the basic purpose of the 1950 unrelated business tax provisions
was "to remove the unfair competitive advantage which tax immunity would
confer upon exempt organization business." It noted, at a later point in the
information release, that its study had confirmed the assertion of taxpayer
groups that a "number of exempt organizations conduct active and competitive advertising businesses in association with their publications." In attempting to tax such advertising revenues, the proposed Regulations, in the
Service's self-serving view, were "[c]arrying out the fundamental policy objec31 3
tive of the unrelated business tax and applying the statutory standards.1
The new Regulations, by way of text and examples, made it explicit that
the solicitation and publication of advertising by "exempt organization" journals constituted a "trade or business" (Regulation section 1.513-1(b)) which
was "unrelated" to the organization's exempt purposes (Regulation section
1.513-1(b)(4)(iv) Examples (6) and (7)), and the Regulations also offered rules
by which exempt organizations deriving journal advertising revenues could
compute allowable deductions to arrive at "unrelated business taxable income"
(Regulation section 1.512(a)-(1)(d)(2) and (e) Example (2)).
Under the 1958 Regulations the term "trade or business" had been con3 14
strued as referring to an entire, unfragmented economic unit or enterprise.
The new Regulations, on the other hand, explicitly defined the term as including "any activity carried on for the production of income." The Regulations specifically stated that the term "is not limited to integrated aggregates
of assets, activities and good will which comprise businesses for the purposes
of certain other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. ' 31 5 The purpose
and significance of this new definition for exempt journal advertising revenues is not left for the gentle reader's speculation. The Regulations categori316

cally state:

Nation's Business, published by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States with an estimated
four million dollars gross annual advertising revenues, Journal of the American Medical Association
with an estimated ten million dollars gross annual advertising revenues, and National Geographic
published by the National Geographic Society with an estimated six million dollars gross annual
advertising revenues.
313. T.I.R. No. 899, supra note 310.
314. Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259, at 798. See also Cooper, Trends in the Taxation of Unrelated Business Activity, 29 INSTITUTE ON FED. TAXATION, N.Y.U. PROCEEDINGS 1999, 2007 (1971).
Cooper notes that the 1958 Regulations used examples, drawn from the 1950 Committee Reports, (see Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(4), "[d]efinition of unrelated trade or business applicable to
taxable years beginning before Dec. 13, 1967") which appeared to refer only to entire enterprises
as the potential objects of the tax.
315. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1967) (emphasis added).
316. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1967).
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Similarly, activities of soliciting, selling, and publishing commercial advertising
do not lose identity as trade or business even though the advertising is published in an exempt organization periodical which contains editorial matter
related to the exempt purposes of the organization.
Some critics have argued that this new definition of "trade or business" is
inconsistent with congressional intent.3 17 The 1950 Senate Finance Committee
Report had flatly stated that the "term 'trade or business' has the same meaning as it has elsewhere in the Code, as, for example, in Sec. 23(a)(1) [now
Code section 1 6 2 ]. ' 13 1 s Also, the 1950 statute refers to "any trade or business"
without using the term "activities." Moreover, the statute as enacted should be
contrasted with a bill introduced by Representative Mason of the House Ways
and Means Committee in 1949 but not enacted; 319 that bill would have subjected to tax "all business income," defined to include income from "any activity of a kind which is recognized as an ordinary trade or business activity. 32 °
In addition, the examples of trades and businesses offered in the 1950 Senate
Report, i.e., a tire business, a wheat farm, a university press, 32 1 clearly conform
to the definition of "trade or business" as a single economic unit, rather than
as an "activity." The wording of the statute, which defines unrelated business
taxable income as "gross income . . . from any unrelated trade or business,"
less allowable deductions, also indicates Congress's intent to reach only a trade
or business, which is unrelated, but not unrelated business activities carried on
by an exempt organization in conjunction with the performance of its exempt
3 22

purposes.

317. Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259, at 798-800. See also Moore, Current Problems of Exempt
Organizations, 24 TAX L. REv. 469, 475-76 (1968).

318. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1950).
319. H.R. REP. No. 5064, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). This point is made by Moore, supra
note 317, at 476. See also Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259, at 795.
320. See H.R. REP. No. 5064, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), quoted by Weithorn & Liles id.
321. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 107 (1950). Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259,
at 800. As noted, the Report states that "[I]ncomes from a university press would be exempt in
the ordinary case since it would be derived from an activity that is 'substantially related' to the
purpose of the university." S. REIP. No. 2375, supra at 29. Congress, if it considered at all the
presence of advertising in such presses, certainly expressed no intention that advertising revenues
be taxed.
322. Weithorn & Liles, supra note 259, at 799; 1954 CODE § 512(a)(1) (emphasis added). In
Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. United States, 35 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 75-963 (D. Mass. 1974),
aff'd, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9392 (1st Cir. 1975), involving the applicability of the unrelated business tax to the advertising revenues of a medical journal, District Judge Skinner ruled that "[t]he
conversion by the Treasury of the concept of 'trade or business' in Section 513 of the Internal
Revenue Code into the notion of an isolated 'activity' in Reg. [§] is unwarranted." He pointed to
the arguments presented in Moore, supra note 317. He also noted that "Congress felt obliged to
change the statute in order to reach the result sought to be achieved by the regulation for years
beginning after Dec. 31, 1969." 35 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 75-963. The Court of Claims agrees with
the reasoning of the First Circuit in Massachusetts Medical Society v. United States, and reaches the
same result in American College of Physicians v. United States, No. 100-74 (Ct. Cl., Feb. 18,
1976).
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The new Regulations' definition of "regularly carried on ' 323 shows the
same strong emphasis on the "competitiveness" of the exempt organization as
was noted in T.I.R. 899. In Regulation section 1.513-1(c)(1), the Treasury
reiterated that the purpose of the tax is to "place exempt organization business activities upon the same tax basis as the non-exempt business endeavors
with which they compete." In determining whether an exempt organization's
"intermittent" business activities should be classified as "regularly carried on,"
the manner of their conduct must, therefore, "be compared with the manner
in which commercial activities are normally pursued by non-exempt
organizations.1"324 Thus, intermittent activities carried on "without the competitive and promotional efforts typical of commercial endeavors," (and here
the Treasury favorably offers the example of advertising in programs
for sports events or music performances) are not deemed to be "regularly
carried on."""
The final element required for imposition of the tax, i.e., that the trade or
business not be "substantially related" to the organization's exempt purposes,
has also been redefined in the new Regulations. 32 6 The old test, requiring that
the business's "principal purpose" be to further exempt purposes was replaced by a new test requiring that "the production or distribution of the
goods or the performance of the services . . . must contribute importantly to

3 27
the accomplishment" of the exempt purposes.
The Treasury dubiously declared this new test more liberal than the old
one. 28 However, whereas advertising revenues of an exempt organization's
"related" journal were not taxed under the old test, such advertising revenues, under the new test, are deemed "unrelated" and therefore subject to
tax. Moreover, as specified by the examples in the new Regulations, 3 2 I all
such advertising is deemed unrelated, whether it be "general consumer advertising" or advertising limited to "products which are within the general area
of professional interest" of the organization's members.3 3 " Albeit, it could be
cogently argued that this second category of advertising (e.g., advertising of
drugs in a medical association's journal) "contributes importantly" to the exempt purpose of educating members as to products meeting their professional needs, Treasury's example flatly rejects this argument, stating that the
"publication of advertising designed and selected in the manner of ordinary

323. Treas.
324. Treas.
325. Id.
326. Treas.
327. Treas.
328. T.I.R.
liberalizations."
329. Treas.
330. Id.

Reg. § 1.513-1(c) (1967).
Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii) (1967).
Reg. § 1.513-1(d) (1967).
Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (1967).
No. 899, supra note 310. The change was described as one of "several important
Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) Examples (6),(7) (1967).
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commerical advertising" cannot be classified as educational. 331 In so reasoning, the Treasury mistakenly looks to the purpose of the advertisers rather
than that of the exempt organization publisher.
The statutory definition of "unrelated business taxable income," as the
gross income from any unrelated trade or business less the expenses "directly
connected with the carrying on of such trade or business," posed a real dilemma for the Treasury. On the one hand, Treasury had declared the goal of
putting the competing business activities of exempt and non-exempt organizations on an equal basis; however, this statutory definition of unrelated business taxable income, taken in conjunction with Treasury's new definition of
"trade or business" to include an activity, such as advertising, would seem
logically to require that an exempt journal be taxed on its advertising revenues with deductions allowed only for advertising expenses, even though the
journal as a whole was operating at an overall loss. Treasury chose a pragmatic solution; it chose to uphold its goal of an "equal tax basis" even though it
involved stretching the scope of the statutory term "directly connected" expenses. Thus, under the new Regulations (section 1.512(a)-l(d)(2) Example
(2)) an exempt organization publishing a journal whose editorial content is
deemed "related" to its exempt purposes, nevertheless may apply the expenses (in excess of subscription revenues) attributable to this exempt editorial activity against the "unrelated" non-exempt advertising revenues; under
the Regulations' "equal tax basis" approach, such "exempt activity" expenses
are deemed to be "directly connected" with the carrying on of the nonexempt advertising business, because such editorial expenses are "costs generally incurred by taxable organizations publishing journals with advertising."
(Example (2)). So much for the logic of the Treasury's position!
E.

Congressional Response

The publication of the new Regulations in December of 1967 provoked
congressional interest in the issue of advertising revenues, or rather the battle
shifted to the Hill. The issue was considered twice by Congress in 1968, but
no legislation resulted.3 32 An exemption from tax for advertising revenues of
exempt journals passed the Senate, but failed to survive the Conference. 333
Later in the year the full Senate rejected a one year postponement of the
Regulations' effective date, which had been approved by the Senate Finance
3 34
Committee.
On reconsidering the continuing issue the next year, Congress finally
enacted a provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which endorsed the
331.
332.
333.
334.

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) Example (7) (1967).
Moore, supra note 317, at 477.
Id.
Id.
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Treasury's redefinition of "trade or business" for purposes of the unrelated
business tax. Newly enacted section 513(c), entitled "Advertising, Etc. Activities," defined "trade or business" for purposes of the unrelated business
tax as "any activity which is carried on for the production of income from the
sale of goods or the performance of services"; the new provision further
33 5
stated:
For purposes of the preceding sentence, an activity does not lose identity as a
trade or business merely because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of
similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or
may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.
As the title of this new provision indicates, Congress was concerned
primarily with advertising revenues of exempt organization journals. The new
statutory provision, however, would seem to deal only with the definition of
"trade or business," and to leave unaffected the definition of "unrelated."
Thus, exempt organizations can still argue, with respect to advertisements in
their related journals, that certain kinds of advertising (e.g., advertising of
products relating to the professional interests of the exempt organization's
33 6
members), are "related" to the organization's exempt purposes.
CONCLUSION

The prior history related above speaks pretty well for itself. Each reader is
free to interpret it and read into it what he will. However, some conclusions
may be safely drawn: From the very beginning of our federal income tax
laws, charities have been exempted from tax; in addition, from very early
dates both individuals and corporations have been encouraged to support
charities through allowance of tax deductions for charitable contributions,
335. 1954 CODE § 513(c) (emphasis added).
336. A somewhat similar issue, which the IRS has not yet resolved, is whether the unrelated
business tax should be imposed upon income received by exempt organizations from supplier
exhibits at their conventions. IRS might attempt to assimilate this case to its treatment of advertising revenues, on-the theory that the ultimate purpose of the suppliers is to sell their products. On
the other hand, IRS might focus more properly on the principal purpose of the association in
holding the suppliers' show, namely to educate its members as to available products. An appropriate analogy could be found in the definition of membership income in § 277 (added by the
1969 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487) to include income from institutes and
trade shows which are "primarily for the education of members." In fact, one well might argue
that, in the area of journal advertising also, the IRS should have put heavier emphasis on the
exempt organizations' purposes, rather than on the purpose of the advertiser.
[Note: After this article went to press, the IRS published a series of five Revenue Rulings dealing with the treatment of income from the rental of display space to exhibitors at exempt organization sponsored trade shows. See Rev. Ruls. 75-516 - 75-520, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 48, at
18-23. Generally, the Rulings focus on the "potential informational value" of the exhibits and,
primarily, the presence or absence of selling and order-taking as determining whether the space
rental income is unrelated business income.
Similarly, after this article went to press, the Treasury adopted amendments to the Regulations dealing with the advertising income of exempt organizations. See T.D. 7392, 1976 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 3. at 7. The text and prior footnotes refer to the Regulations prior to this amendment.]
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which have been unlimited in the case of the gift and estate taxes, and which
over the years have been generously increased and made more liberal as far
as the income tax deduction is concerned. One does not have to be an
economist to appreciate what this tax encouragement has meant to the development of private philanthropy in this country. Our record of achievement
in this regard is unique in the world and one of which all taxpayers can be
justly proud. Moreover, when tax abuses inevitably appeared, attempts were
made to deal with them carefully, in a limited way designed to eliminate the
abuses without harming private charity. Here again, the record preceding the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 was not a mean achievement. Having come this far
and having achieved so much under a tax system which encourages private
philanthropy, it would be a disaster if we were at this late date to decide to
junk the present system in favor of some untried scheme of direct government subsidy or operation of all charity.

